EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout much of the 25-year Sri Lankan conflict, attention has focused on
the confrontation between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils.
The views of the country’s Muslims, who are 8 per cent of the population and
see themselves as a separate ethnic group, have largely been ignored.
Understanding their role in the conflict and addressing their political
aspirations are vital if there is to be a lasting peace settlement. Muslims
need to be part of any renewed peace process but with both the government
and LTTE intent on continuing the conflict, more immediate steps should be
taken to ensure their security and political involvement. These include
control of the Karuna faction, more responsive local and national
government, improved human rights mechanisms and a serious political
strategy that recognises minority concerns in the east.
At least one third of Muslims live in the conflict-affected north and east
and thus have a significant interest in the outcome of the war. They have
often suffered serious hardship, particularly at the hands of the Tamil
rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since 1990 Muslims
have been the victims of ethnic cleansing, massacres and forced displacement
by the insurgents.
The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) was a disappointment to many Muslims.
They had no independent representation at the peace talks, and many feared
that any agreement that gave the LTTE exclusive control of the north and
east, even in a federal arrangement, would be seriously detrimental to their
own interests. Despite talks between Muslim leaders and the LTTE, they
continued to suffer violent attacks. Since the resumption of large-scale
military action in mid-2006, Muslims have again been caught up in the
fighting in the east. Dozens have been killed and thousands displaced. They
have also come into conflict with a new, pro-government Tamil paramilitary
group, the Karuna faction. Memories of LTTE oppression are still fresh, and
rancorous disputes with Tamils over land and resources remain potent in the
east.
Muslim political leaders have often been divided, representing different
historical experiences and geographical realities as well as personal and
political differences. Muslims in the east and north – who have been
fundamentally affected by the conflict – often have very different views
from those who live in the south among the Sinhalese. Nevertheless, there is
consensus on some key issues and a desire to develop a more united approach
to the conflict.
Muslims have never resorted to armed rebellion to assert their political
position, although some have worked with the security forces, and a few were
members of early Tamil militant groups. Fears of an armed movement emerging
among Muslims, perhaps with a facade of Islamist ideology, have been present
since the early 1990s, but most have remained committed to channelling their
frustrations through the political process and negotiating with the
government and Tamil militants at different times.
There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue,
particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the
Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are
small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements
emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have
been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but
there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the
conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists.
There is increasing interest among some Muslims in more fundamentalist
versions of Islam, and there have been violent clashes between
ultra-orthodox and Sufi movements. This kind of violence remains limited and
most Muslims show considerable tolerance to other sects and other faiths.
Nevertheless, the conflict is at least partly responsible for some Muslims
channelling their frustrations and identity issues into religious disputes.
Muslim peace proposals have tended to be reactive, dependent on the politics
of the major Tamil and Sinhalese parties. Muslim autonomous areas in the
east are being pursued but seem unlikely to be accepted by the present
government. Muslims are concerned about
governance in the east, which have not involved meaningful consultation with
ethnic minorities and do not seem to include significant devolution of
powers to local communities.
In the longer term, only a full political settlement of the conflict can
allow historical injustices against the Muslims to be addressed and begin a
process of reconciliation. The LTTE, in particular, needs to revisit the
history of its dealings with the Muslims if it is to gain any credibility in
a future peace process in which the Muslims are involved. Only an equitable
settlement, in which Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim community concerns are
adequately addressed, can really contain the growing disillusionment among a
new generation of Sri Lankan Muslims.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Sri Lanka:
1. Support the Muslim community’s demand for a separate delegation at any
future peace talks.
2. Ensure that the right of return of northern Muslims to their original
properties and the displacement of eastern Muslims during the conflict are
addressed in any final peace settlement.
3. Establish a presidential commission to investigate the expulsions of the
Muslim population from the
immediate needs and long-term legal, political and physical obstacles to an
eventual return.
4. Ensure that any new interim governing arrangements for the Eastern
province:
(a) include equitable power sharing in which Muslims and Tamils are
adequately represented and local government structures enhanced; and
(b) do not impede a final political settlement of the conflict.
5. Suspend major development plans for the east, such as the Special
Economic Zone in Trincomalee, until there has been serious consultation and
negotiation with local residents and their political representatives.
6. Reject state-aided development or land-settlement schemes with potential
to transform the ethnic balance in the east to the detriment of Muslims and
Tamils and increase development aid to the east, but only in consultation
with local communities and while ensuring an equitable distribution among
communities.
7. Assert effective control over Tamil paramilitary groups, notably the
pro-government Karuna faction (Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Puligal, TMVP),
by:
(a) restricting them in civilian areas to political activity;
(b) prosecuting all TMVP members engaged in criminal activities, including
abduction, child recruitment, robbery and extrajudicial killings; and
(c) strictly limiting the role of TMVP members in administration, relief
and resettlement programs.
8. Investigate and prosecute atrocities and human rights abuses, including
the December 2006 massacre of Muslims in Pottuvil.
9. Take tangible steps to reduce ethnic imbalances in the security forces,
including in Eastern province police.
To the Muslim Community and Political Parties:
10. Build on Muslim communities’ assistance to Tamil internally displaced
persons (IDPs) by developing broader economic and social programs to
encourage Tamil-Muslim reconciliation and cooperation.
11. Monitor carefully the role of Muslim armed groups in the east.
12. Support enforcement of the constitutional rights of all believers and
religious sects to freedom of religion and protection from harassment,
including minority Muslim sects.
13. Encourage more local democracy and better representation among Muslims
and promote state reforms to ensure more equitable distribution of resources
among communities and less reliance on patronage networks.
14. Encourage civil society groups, including expansion of such groups as
the Muslim Council, and greater involvement of women in civil society
movements, and seek broader involvement in and support for the Muslim Peace
Secretariat.
To the LTTE and Other Tamil Political Groups:
15. End any harassment, illegal taxation or human rights abuses of Muslims,
re-examine the record of past abuses and make reconciliation a priority.
16. Support the Muslim community’s demand for a separate delegation at
future peace talks.
17. Publicly assert the right of northern Muslims to return to their
original properties and of Muslims in the east to resume cultivation of
their lands.
18. Make a public commitment to a multiethnic political future for the
north and east, in which Muslims share political power.
To the International Community:
19. Make a greater commitment to include Muslim concerns in any new peace
process, including a separate delegation at peace negotiations.
20. Press the government to:
(a) severely limit the role of the TMVP and prosecute TMVP members who
indulge in criminal activity;
(b) seriously address atrocities in which security personnel may have been
involved and end the climate of impunity; and
(c) include Muslim and Tamil communities in discussions about development
in the east and develop a proper political process to enable real power
sharing in any interim administration.
21. Consult representatives of the Muslim community and take their
priorities into account in planning development assistance.
Colombo/Brussels, 29 May 2007
Thanking you in Advance
Jiffry U Meearashahib
CTO – Global It Solutions Inc. / NetCom Training & Technology Ltd
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