Friday, November 30, 2007

Observations on the LTTE Leader’s Speech

November 30th, 2007

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

The annual Heroe’s Day speech of Prabakaran, the LTTE leader on 27 November 2007, that was being looked forward to, as LTTE’s assessment of the situation and its future plans, contained many nuances, but no surprises.

The main focus of the speech was directed to the international community with an appeal to cease giving military and economic aid to the Sri Lankan government and accept the right to self determination and the sovereignty of the Tamil Nation.

My observations on the speech are

1. The address has more political content than the earlier ones and the first one after Balasingham’s death whose input could be seen in the earlier speeches but not this time. The first few paragraphs give the historical and the international setting of the Tamil struggle.

2. Indian intervention then was termed as part of one of its ‘regional expansion’. This shows that the LTTE did not understand then nor now of Indian sincerity and its efforts to find a reasonable solution. It is conceded that the security aspects of the Indo Sri Lanka could have been avoided but yet the main accord did provide for the first time Indian guarantees of devolution to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. The 13th amendment was not the best of the document but it could have been the beginning to be built upon. It is true that the implementation of the 13th amendment was “blocked by the chauvinistic Sinhala State” as mentioned in the speech, but the LTTE was equally responsible in preventing its implementation ( recall their booklet- “13th Amendment-an autopsy”). The LTTE took upon India which is not a small power and without whose support there could never be a solution. Many well wishers of the Tamil cause in India were aghast when the LTTE sought support from the very Sinhala nation for their arms, equipment and support in fighting the IPKF! If today we see not much of a stir over the killing of Tamil Chelvan in India, the LTTE should have an introspection and see what had alienated India that it does not want to get involved at all on the Tamil question when the Tamil areas in the east have been ravaged and civilians are getting killed everyday due to aerial bombing.

3. It is good to see the mention of the Tamil Diaspora and its value. The term used should have been “Sri Lankan Tamil Expatriates” who have steadfastly supported the movement and the bulk of them still have faith, admiration and hope that the LTTE will one day bring justice to the Tamils. What I have seen before and see even now is the lack of ‘political finesse’ of the LTTE and their over dependence on the military aspects of their struggle. It is time they let the expats do the home work to bring an end to the war with a solution that could be acceptable to all stake holders. Again the Tamil National Alliance despite doubts about its credibility did try its best to put a political “face” on behalf of LTTE. It was however never allowed to think or work independently and the LTTE leadership is responsible for marginalising this entity which in the beginning showed great promise.

4. It is also true( as pointed out in the speech) that Rajapakse government has shut fast the door for peace and it appears to be confident of a military solution. It is also true that they have been considerably helped by many of the countries in providing equipment, weapons and training that is having an impact on the ground. The LTTE appears to be most vulnerable to aerial attacks and big bombs and high explosives are being used. The lethal nature of the bombs could be gauged from the fact that TamilChelvan and five others who were in a bunker were asphyxiated by a very heavy bomb that hit directly and destroyed the entrance. It is important for both sides to realise that there is no military solution. The seeming military advantage the Sri Lankan Security Forces have now is mainly due to the air superiority and if the LTTE gets hold of a few SAMs, the military balance will be restored!

5. I mention this because, sensing victory, the Rajapakse government is dragging its feet on the recommendations of the Vitharana report, Report A etc etc. The All Party Committee it seems has gone on a “holiday” as the LTTE leader has mentioned. Going back, it should be clear to all that the Sri Lankan government has never specifically put forward a clear and specific devolution package except the District Development councils suggested in the Thimpu I talks and the 13th amendment which at any rate was an Indian enforced one. The Sri Lankan Government never responded to ISGA proposals of the LTTE. The ISGA had many objectionable portions but these were never discussed. Till today there has not been any counter proposal. The international community should note this point.

6. Mention is made of Sinhalisation of the east which all reports indicate are true. Names are being changed and the beautiful area of Sampur and Mutur have been made high security zones. A generally peaceful area of Batticola is now one vast refugee camp as the people there have nowhere to go But does this not indicate the failure of the LTTE to protect its own people? In the Sudumalai speech, Prabakaran indicated that the responsibility of protecting the Tamils had been given to India and yet on a messy and in my view avoidable incident ( the Indian side is more to blame) the whole scenario changed!

7. Three of the four Thimpu principles are once again emphasised and any final solution will have to take into account in some form or other, the issues relating to Tamil Home land, the Tamil Nation and the Tamil Right to self determination. Balasingham’s earlier conceptualisation of “internal self determination” unlike ‘external determination’ has now been given up.

8. The Co-chairs have been accused of having failed in their responsibility. Akashi’s efforts in running from place to place have been in vain and there is yet no coordinated and concerted call for enforcing a cease fire by the international community. Cease fire and Peace Process are dead for all practical purposes.

9. Finally, there is a warning to the Sri Lankan government that it had spread its feet “too wide” and will be forced to face serious consequences of its misguided ambitions.

The LTTE’s position since the loss of the east has hardened with no chance of coming to the negotiating table in the near future. Its tactics will change and more incidents in the south could be expected. Douglas Devananda escaped another effort of a suicide bomber and there was an IED explosion in the outskirts of Colombo killing innocent civilians two days ago This is probably in retaliation to the bombing on the day of the speech when many civilians were killed in the LTTE controlled area.

If the LTTE wants the international community to understand them and help them, they should first stop the politics of assassination. Douglas is just a tiny cog in the big wheel of Tamil nationalism and his elimination is not going make the situation easier even for the LTTE.

Prabakaran has always maintained that the “Sinhala Nation” can never be trusted and will never yield any space to the Tamils to meet their aspirations. The Sri Lankan Government is doing its best to prove this point. It is still not too late for the Sri Lankan government to gives up its military option and go for a generous political package no matter what the JVP or the JHU has to say on this issue.

Till that time, the violence that has now been unleashed will keep spiralling and may get out of hand if saner voices do not intervene. [saag.org]

transcurrents.com

Sucide Attack at - Social Welfare Ministry

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

Another suicide attempt on Minister Douglas Devananda in Colombo



The fascist LTTE have once again attempted to take the life of EPDP Secretary General and Social Services and Social Welfare Minister Douglas Devananda using another female suicide bomber. This the 2nd suicide bomb attack by the LTTE on a public day in Colombo on Douglas Devananda, using a woman in both instances.


A woman LTTE suicide bomber had gone to the Ministry of Social Services and Social Welfare at 61 Isapathana Road and had requested to see the Minister, as today is Wednesday, which is the Public Day during which time the Minister meets the public.

As usual the Minister’s Public Relations Officer, senior EPDP member and Colombo EPDP organizer Mr. Stephen was busy registering the names of the visitors around 8:00 a.m. this morning (28-11-007). The young woman appeared to be a needy person to the onlookers. When the woman reached Mr. Stephen he became suspicious and got the help of the Minister’s bodyguard and senior EPDP member Niyas Sithran to assist him in getting the details of the young woman. When they both became suspicious they requested a policewoman to body check the young woman, at which time the suicide bomber detonated the suicide bomb and killed herself and injured Comrades Stephen and Sithran. Stephen succumbed to his injuries at the hospital while Sithran is admitted to the hospital with severe injuries.

Once again Devananda’s valiant and efficient security staff and his Ministerial staff saved his life. Comrade Stephen lost his life while preventing the LTTE suicide bomber from reaching his leader and Minister Devananda.

In July 2004, the LTTE sent its first woman suicide bomber in an attempt to kill Devananda at his then Ministry Office in Kolupity, also on a Public Day, which falls on every Wednesday, when the Ministers meet the Public in Sri Lanka.

EPDENEWS.COM

17 killed, 37 injured in Nugegoda blast






By: Ranil Wijayapala and Chaminda Perera

At least 17 civilians were confirmed killed and 37 civilians were injured as a suspected parcel bomb exploded near a popular


A handbag that belonged to one of the Nugegoda bomb victims. Picture by Sudath Nishantha

fashion store at Nugegoda junction around 5.55 p.m. yesterday.

Police believe that the parcel bomb had been placed in one of the parcel counters at the No Limit clothing store by a suspected LTTE cadre who had left the scene. The No Limit store and the adjoining building were damaged by the resulting explosion and fire. The shops and the nearby bus halt was crowded during the evening rush hour.

The busy Nugegoda junction filled with students after their tuition classes and a large number of home bound office workers witnessed chaotic scenes immediately after the explosion causing a huge traffic jam on the High Level road and Stanley Thillekeratne Mawatha towards Kohuwala.

“The explosion was due to a suspicious parcel bomb kept in the parcel counter of the No Limit fashion shop,” Military Spokesman Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara told the Daily News.

According to reports, the bomb had exploded as a private security guard at the shop attempted to search a suspicious parcel kept in the parcel counter with the assistance of a Police officer on duty close to the Nugegoda junction, Brigadier Nanayakkara added.

The bodies were brought to the Kalubowila Teaching hospital after the incident. Four of the bodies charred beyond recognition were also lying at the hospital.

According to the Director of the Kalubowila Teaching hospital, Dr. W.G. Gunawardena 33 injured persons were admitted to the hospital after the incident and four seriously injured persons were transferred to the Colombo National hospital.

Firefighting vehicles from the Kotte Municipal Council and the Dehiwala Mount Lavinia Municipal Councils rushed to the scene to douse the fire that broke out inside the No Limit fashion outlet.

More than 12 motorbikes parked inside the vehicle park of the fashion outlet and some three wheelers parked along the road were also gutted in the fire.

People who were in the vicinity when the bomb blast occurred explained their experiences with horror.

Ranjan Perera of Mirihana who parks his three wheeler opposite the No Limit Fashion store said a massive explosion followed by fire and a cloud of smoke stunned him.

“As I got down from the threewheeler, I heard a massive blast and I ran towards the Fashion store. I saw bodies strewn here and there and helped police to take the injured to hospital”.

Percy Godwin whose wife has been admitted to the Kalubowila hospital with injuries said he could not even think of what actually happened.

“I came to No Limit with my wife to buy a pair of shoes for her. As we came out of the shop, we heard a blast and my wife fell down.”

Dayana Suraweera who has been admitted to the Kalubowila Hospital with injuries said she was about to cross the road when the blast occurred. I did not know what happened thereafter, she said.

“I was on the top floor of a shoe shop with my wife and child when I heard a big blast and there were glass pieces all over us,” resident A. Jayasena told reporters. “As we ran away, I saw the entrance of the No Limit shop burning, and in the midst of it, a schoolgirl on the floor trying to get up and then falling back again.”

The Hospital staff including the surgeons and consultants were busy carrying out urgent surgeries to save the lives of critically injured persons.

Hospital minor staffers were waiting opposite the hospital premises till the patients were brought to the hospital.
Dailynews.lk/2007/11/29/

Tuesday, November 27, 2007

V Pirapaharan, in his annual Heroes' Day statement




Propping up genocidal Sinhala State counterproductive, International Community should change approach - Pirapaharan

[TamilNet, Tuesday, 27 November 2007, 12:33 GMT]
The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), V Pirapaharan, in his annual Heroes' Day statement placed a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the international community for the breakdown of the peace process. He said that the involvement of the international community to resolve the Tamil national question has been unhelpful and added that their failure to condemn unambiguously the military path of the current regime has created the present situation in the island. He asserted that the propping up of the genocidal Sinhala State by the international community through economic aid, military aid and subtle diplomatic efforts will be counterproductive.


About the long and bitter history of deception by the Sinhala State he further said, “None of the Southern parties are ready to accept the core principles for a lasting peace: the Tamil homeland, the Tamil nation and the Tamil Right to self determination. The ruling party is adamant on unitary rule; the red and yellow parties are calling for no solution at all; and the main opposition party, somersaulting from its earlier position, is, on the one hand, saying nothing concrete and using evasive language to support the military actions of the government and, on the other hand, saying it supports peace efforts. All this clearly clarifies our point and proves beyond doubt that all the Sinhala political parties are essentially chauvinistic and anti-Tamil. To expect a political solution from any of these Southern parties is political naivety.”

The Tamil text of LTTE leaders statement
Drawing the attention of the international community to this long history of deception by the chauvinistic Sinhala State, the Tamil national leader said that the confidence of the Tamil people on the international community has been eroded by their one-sided approach. He pointed out that nations like East Timor and Montenegro broke free of their subjugation and gained their freedom with the help and support of the international community. He added that the actions of the international community with respect to the Tamil national question are unjust and said that Tamil people hoped that the international community would change their biased approach and recognize the sovereignty of the Tamil nation.

The LTTE leader called on the global Tamil community to support the Tamil Eelam freedom struggle. “I wish to express my love and gratitude to you for your past participation in the building of our nation, bringing together your abundant intellectual, material, monetary and many other resources in the service of our nation and ask that you stand with us in the coming years of our freedom struggle,” he said.

The full text of the official translation of his speech follows:


The 21st century began as the ‘Asian century’ and the world is looking towards Asia. Many countries in our region have grown in leaps and bounds in social, economical and scientific fields. They are researching space, moon and atom. The whole human race is taking up new challenges and has embarked on a united path, seeking answers to many of nature’s mysteries and looking for remedies to incurable diseases. It is seeking to protect the entire globe and its plant and animal lives. Sadly, the Sinhala nation is moving in exactly the opposite direction, on a path of destruction. It is trying to destroy the Tamil nation and, in the process, it is destroying itself. This beautiful island continues to soak in blood.

Buddhism is a profound spiritual duty. Its philosophy emphasizes a life without desires, a life of love and justice. The Sinhala nation, claiming that it has followed this path for more than two thousand years, has in fact remained immersed in the poison of racism. It is unleashing unthinkable violence against another people. During the long history of the Tamil struggle, first through non-violence and later through armed struggle, the Sinhala mindset has remained unchanged. The Sinhala nation did not change even after so much destruction and lost lives. It continues on the path of violence. It only desires to find a solution to the Tamil question through military might and oppression. It cunningly evaded efforts to seek peace and is boldly taking forward its military plan. The international community’s economic and military aid, its moral and political support, its diplomatic efforts, and its one-sided involvement directly aided this turn of events.


We know very well that the military, economic and geo-political interests of the world’s powers are embedded in our region. We understand their concern to take forward their interests. We also recognize the concerns of the international community to bring about stability and good governance to this island for these reasons. At the same time the chauvinistic Sinhala State is attempting to exploit this interest in our region of the international powers. It is trapping the international community in its chauvinistic project and turning the international community against the Tamil freedom struggle. Our people are dismayed and disappointed that these countries, trapped in the deceptive net of the Sinhala State, are being unhelpful in their involvement to resolve our problem. These one-sided involvements of foreign powers are not new in our prolonged struggle. India intervened in our national question then as part of its regional expansion. India signed an accord with the Sinhala State without the consent of the Tamils. The Indo-Lanka Accord was not signed to meet the aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. In fact, India then attempted to force an ineffectual solution on our people - a solution which did not even devolve powers to the extent of the Banda-Chelva pact signed in the 1950’s. India tried to enforce that accord with the strength of more than 100,000 Indian forces, with the power of the agreement between two countries and with the assistance of treacherous Tamil paramilitary groups. However, even this ill-considered solution, which did not even address the basic national aspirations of the Tamils, was blocked by the chauvinistic Sinhala State.

We are intimately familiar with the Sinhala State and its deceptive politics. Our people have a long history of bitter experiences. That is why we explained to India on many occasions, at many locations and at many levels about the implacability of Sinhala chauvinism. We explained to India then that the aim of the Sinhala State was not to find a solution to the Tamil question and bring peace; but to occupy the Tamil homeland, destroy its resources, and enslave the Tamil nation. India refused to accept this reality. As a result our land witnessed great sorrow and destruction.


Today, the international community is making the same mistake that India made many years ago. Even the countries that are the guardians of the peace efforts succumbed to the deception of the Sinhala State and listed our freedom movement as a terrorist organization. What we find most incomprehensible is the fact that these same nations, which labeled us terrorists, not so long ago fought in defence of their own freedom.

The Sinhala nation is unable to stomach the support of our Diaspora for the Tamil freedom struggle; it is unable to accept the humanitarian help and the political lobbying by the Diaspora to end the misery heaped on our people. That is why the Sinhala nation is trying hard to shatter the bond between our people in our homeland and our Diaspora. Some countries are also assisting this amoral effort of Sinhala chauvinism. These countries are denouncing, as illegal activities, the humanitarian actions and political protests of our people abroad – actions that are carried out according to the laws of those countries. These countries have imprisoned and humiliated Tamil campaigners and representatives. These countries have ridiculed their protests and their efforts to seek justice.

This partisan and unjust conduct of the international community has severely undermined the confidence our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts. Furthermore, the generous military and economic aid they have given to the Sinhala State and their diplomatic efforts to prop up the chauvinistic Sinhala State has encouraged the Sinhala nation further and further along its militaristic path. This is the background to the confidence of the Rajapake regime in continuing with its unjust, inhuman war of occupation of our land.

Overconfident of its military victory over the Tamil freedom movement, the Rajapakse regime has shut fast the door for peace. The desire to oppress the Tamils has intensified as never before. With the entire world giving support, the Sinhala State, using the ceasefire as cover, and exploiting the peace environment, prepared its war of occupation. The SLMM that was monitoring the peace covered its eyes, tied its hands behind back, and went to sleep in Colombo. The exhausted Norwegian facilitators remained silent. The countries that preached peace to us also went silent and refused to speak out. The Sinhala State started its war and justified it with slogans like ‘War for Peace’, ‘War against terrorism’ and ‘War for the liberation of the Tamils’.

The Rajapakse regime assembled its military might and let loose a massive war on the eastern region of our homeland. This part of our homeland became a wasteland after incessant bombing and shelling. Trincomalee, the famous Tamil capital, was destroyed. Batticaloa, an ancient cultural city of the Tamils, became a land of refugees. Jaffna, the cultural centre of the Tamils, was cut off from the rest of the world and turned into an open prison.

The Sinhala State’s war of genocide destroyed the peaceful life of the Tamils. It turned the Tamils into refugees in their own homeland, ruined their nation’s social and economical infrastructure and plunged them into unprecedented hardships. While our motherland, caught within gruesome Sinhala military rule, is destroyed, Sinhalisation of our historic territory is going on under the pretexts of High Security Zones and Free Trade Zones. This naked Sinhalisation proceeds by the hoisting of Lion flags, the erection of Sidharthan statues, the renaming of Tamil streets with Sinhala names, the building of Buddhist temples. Sinhala settlements are mushrooming in the Tamil homeland.

The unjust war, the economic blockade, the restrictions on our people’s freedom of movement, the killing of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, have all deeply wounded the Tamil psyche. The Sinhala nation is celebrating this tragedy as a victory. It is lighting firecrackers believing it has defeated the Tamils. The Sinhala military leadership believes that its occupation of the east has been completed and the barbed wire noose around the neck of Jaffna has been tightened. The Sinhala nation arrogantly believes it has manacled the eastern coast from Pothuvil to Pulmoddai. The Sinhala leadership thus believes it has won great victories against our struggle.

The Sinhala nation has always misunderstood our freedom struggle. It consistently underestimates us. Only after carefully scrutinising the global situation and external conditions; only after accurately estimating the strengths and weaknesses of the adversary; only after gauging the enemy’s goals and strategies; only after ensuring that we remain focused on our own strategy; only then did we implement our plans to take our liberation struggle forward. We have strategically withdrawn from the east while launching defensive attacks. The Sinhala nation could have learnt the dangers of putting its feet too wide apart in our land as it did during past battles. But the Sinhala military has fallen yet again into the net we spread and it is now forced to commit large numbers of troops to rule land without people. Caught in a territorial trap, it will soon be forced to face the serious consequences of its misguided ambitions.

Operation ‘Ellalan’, the very first combined Black Tiger and Tamil Eelam Air Force attack was a massive blow to the Sinhala military. It has disrupted the daydreams of the Sinhala nation. The Sinhala nation has not emerged from this massive shock delivered by our beloved fighters. The immeasurable dedication and sacrifice of our Heroes is delivering a message to the Sinhala nation. Those who plan to destroy the Tamil nation will in the end be forced to face their own destruction.

The Rajapakse regime is never going to realize that the Tamil national question cannot be resolved by military oppression. The Sinhala leadership is not going to shed its desire for military supremacy or the Sinhalisation of the Tamil homeland. The Rajapakse regime is working hard to import more and more destructive weapons from all over the world without care for the cost. Therefore, it is not going to give up its war of genocide.


The All Party Representative Committee was appointed by the Rajapakse regime to spread a smokescreen over the misery that its military adventures are creating in the Tamil homeland and to deceive other governments to get their aid and support. We clearly predicted this would happen one year ago. We have been proved right. After dragging on without putting forward any solution, the committee has gone on holiday.

The past sixty years have proven beyond any doubt that no political party in the South has the political honesty or firmness in policy to find a just solution to the Tamil national question. It has been also proved beyond any doubt that none of the Southern parties are ready to accept the core principles for a lasting peace: the Tamil homeland, the Tamil nation and the Tamil Right to self determination. The ruling party is adamant on unitary rule; the red and yellow parties are calling for no solution at all; and the main opposition party, somersaulting from its earlier position, is, on the one hand, saying nothing concrete and using evasive language to support the military actions of the government and, on the other hand, saying it supports peace efforts. All this clearly clarifies our point and proves beyond doubt that all the Sinhala political parties are essentially chauvinistic and anti-Tamil. To expect a political solution from any of these southern parties is political naivety.

The Sinhala nation showed eagerness in the peace talks only when we shattered their ‘Operation Fireball’ military action and made them realize that the Tigers cannot be defeated. It was only when we proved our military prowess and only when we were militarily in a position of strength that the Sinhala nation signed the ceasefire agreement. Now, with abundant monetary and military aid from several countries, it has rehabilitated its destroyed military and has prepared itself for war again. It is yet again walking the military path having abandoned the peace path.

The Rajapakse regime, after unilaterally abrogating the ceasefire agreement, is ruthlessly implementing its military plan to remove the contiguity of the Tamil homeland. It has killed and disappeared thousands of our people. It reprimands and controls the Norwegian facilitators. It vehemently criticizes the SLMM. It even dares to brand senior UN officials as terrorists in order to hide its own terrorism. It is obscuring the ground reality in the Tamil homeland by striking fear among journalists and NGO workers.

The world’s powers, even while taking forward their own geo-political interests, respect human rights and democratic institutions. Be it this universe, human affairs or international relationships, they all revolve on the wheel of justice. That is why nations like East Timor and Montenegro broke free of their subjugation and gained their freedom with the help and support of the international community. Even now, the international community continues to work for the freedom of nations like Kosovo.

Yet the actions of the international community with respect to our own national question are unjust. The confidence our people placed in the international community has been eroded. By only paying lip-service to peace the international community has contributed to the killing of an extraordinary son of our nation, Tamilselvan. It has stopped the heartbeat of a light that walked the path of peace. I will be lighting the lamp for my dear brother, Tamilselvan, who until last year was with me every time we, with a burning desire to reach our goal, lit the lamps for our fallen Heroes. The international community has made the entire Tamil world drown in its tears. Had the international community firmly and unambiguously condemned the anti-peace activities and the war mongering of the Sinhala regime, Tamilselvan would be alive today. A huge blow would not have fallen on peace efforts.

The Co-chairs, acting as the guardians of the peace process, have failed in their responsibility. If the Co-chairs do not have a moral obligation to protect peace efforts, what exactly is the purpose of their meeting from time to time in different places? Is it their intent to assist the Sinhala regime to wipe out the Tamils? Questions like these have arisen in the minds of our people. Our people firmly expect that at least from now on the international community will take a new approach in relation to our freedom struggle. On this sacred day it is the hope of our people that the international community will cease giving military and economic aid to the Sinhala regime and accept the right to self determination and the sovereignty of the Tamil nation.

My beloved people,

We are an ancient people with special qualities. We have a unique national identity and national foundation. We have been struggling non-violently and by armed struggle for a very long time against national oppression. We are not terrorists, committing blind acts of violence impelled by racist or religious fanaticism. Our struggle has a concrete, legitimate, political objective. We are struggling only to regain our sovereignty in our own historical land where we have lived for centuries, the sovereignty which we lost to colonial occupiers. We are struggling only to reestablish that sovereignty and rebuild our nation. The Sinhala nation is continuing to reject our just and civilized demands for freedom. Instead, it has declared a genocidal war on our land and our people. Behind the smokescreen of fighting terrorism, it is creating immense human misery.

Despite our people enduring injustice and oppression, facing death, destruction and massive displacement, no country, no nation, no international organization has raised its voice on our behalf. We face this situation alone because, although 80 million Tamils live all around the globe, the Tamils do not have a country of their own.

On this day, when we remember our Heroes, I ask the entire Tamil speaking world to rise up for the liberation of Tamil Eelam. I wish to express my love and gratitude to you for your past participation in the building of our nation, bringing together your abundant intellectual, material, monetary and many other resources in the service of our nation and ask that you stand with us in the coming years of our freedom struggle.

Thousands of our fighters are standing ready to fight with determination for our just goal of freedom and we will overcome the hurdles before us and liberate our motherland. On this day when we remember our Heroes who sacrificed themselves for this sacred goal, let each one of us carry their dream in our hearts and struggle until it is achieved. (Tamilnet 27/11/07)

Sunday, November 25, 2007

Politics of terror in devil's playground -By J.S. Tissainayagam



File photo: Pillaiyan (extreme left) and Karuna (centre) addressing their cadres during a visit to a camp run by the Karuna (now Pillaiyan) group in the east last year.

Last week this column highlighted UPFA parliamentarian Basil Rajapaksa hinting that TNA's Suresh Premachandran security could not be guaranteed when travelling in the East, if he supported the LTTE.

On Sunday afternoon the son-in-law of T. Kanagasabai, MP, (TNA-Batticaloa District) was abducted, reportedly by the Pillaiyan Group. This was followed by security being withdrawn from the homes of two other eastern province TNA parliamentarians.

The reason for these acts was apparently to coerce TNA MPs to support the government in the crucial vote on the budget's second reading. Though the act did not result perhaps in all what the government wanted - a total abstention by TNA parliamentarians during the time of the vote - it did have limited effect. Kanagasabai was not in the chamber when the vote was taken, though all other TNA MPs present voted against the government.

The incident exemplifies three issues that will be of importance in the days to come. First, it shows that unlike in the case of members of other political parties, TNA members and others who support their brand of politics have to contend with a special breed of repression. For instance, before the vote on Monday, there was intense horse trading going on between members of the other political parties conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation such as surrounding MPs' homes with military personnel or withdrawing their security. However, the actual act of violence - abduction - was perpetrated only on a relative of a TNA parliamentarian.

The reason for such 'special' treatment being meted out to TNA parliamentarians is very clear. It was hinted by Basil Rajapaksa in his statement. The moment one's politics even hints at changing the fundamental structures of the Sri Lankan state to make it more accommodative, or challenges the ideology of Sinhala hegemony, he or she is labelled 'pro-LTTE.' And virtually anything can be done to someone who is 'pro-LTTE.'

That such 'special' treatment will not be opposed by most non-TNA MPs, at least publicly, was seen when the matter of the abduction was brought up in parliament by the TNA. Except for Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe stating that it was a gross violation of parliamentary privilege, not one MP spoke out. Where were leaders of the other non-Sinhala parties - the SLMC, the CWC and the UPF? And what were the LSSP and CP members who wear their democratic credentials on a sleeve doing?

Non-TNA parliamentarians (and others) find the TNA objectionable because the party's politics finds resonance with the people of the North and East who voted overwhelmingly for the Alliance. Voters who helped secure 22 seats cannot be dismissed as the Tamil lunatic fringe!

The second set of issues is associated with Pillaiyan. This column has repeatedly stated that the military was keener in sidelining Karuna than working with him because of his political ambitions. Pillaiyan however was a minion who would serve any master who gives him protection and money.

The abduction credited to Pillaiyan demonstrates only too well that the only transformation that has come about in the paramilitaries in the East with the relocation of Karuna to Britain is a change of heads. It shows that the apparatus of terror which the government was operating through the paramilitaries is still functioning and can be activated when the government wishes to, although leaders may be different.

The Pillaiyan episode and the environment in which Tamils of the North and East have to conduct their politics pose many important questions on what might happen in the event the opposition succeeds in defeating the third reading of the budget in the House on December 14. That is the third set of issues.

If the vote on the budget is defeated, in all likelihood it may lead to a general election. If that is the case, the North and the East are likely to become a battle zone, because as stated above, there is greater room for the government to act with impunity in that region than elsewhere in Sri Lanka. The ultimatum given by Pillaiyan to the TNA to leave the East clearly shows his intentions. He knows he will be supported by the security forces. Similarly, the EPDP, also backed by the military, could create a climate of terror in the North, barring the areas under LTTE control.

Paramilitaries will ensure that the TNA does not campaign effectively. One could be sure they will run amok on election-day too, coercing voters and stuffing boxes to force the result they favour.

One way a free and fair election could be ensured is for the international community to intervene and put strictures on the government not to violate the rule of law. But the international community has consistently displayed a lack of respect to the TNA by calling them "LTTE proxies." But whatever names the TNA is called what cannot be gainsaid is that they are elected by the people of the North and East. And therein lies the rub.

To the international community and India, the TNA's popular backing is a problem. They would be unmindful if this support is broken, even by fraudulent means, if the result could be interpreted as an erosion of the legitimacy of the Tigers. This would also facilitate the entry of other parties to parliament with which the international community could play the game of divide and rule. They would then go on to say that the LTTE is merely a military outfit fighting a war that has no popular backing.

Finally, even if the international community were to pressurise the government to hold free and fair elections will the government listen? With the presidency still intact, Mahinda Rajapaksa will go hell for leather to ensure his party's victory. In this light, even though he might be amenable to observing a modicum of law and order in the South because of its importance in shaping public opinion, the North and East will be a veritable devil's playground.

These are the questions the TNA will have to ponder before voting on December 14. The flip side is however that unless the LTTE is able to tip the military balance decisively in favour of the Tamils, the TNA would be facing the same disadvantage if elections are held now or later.

Much will depend therefore on what the LTTE can achieve on the battlefield in the coming months because it will not only influence the vote in the North and East, but also have a profound impact on the politics of the South that are today dependent on 'overcoming terrorism' for their efficacy.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk

Saturday, November 24, 2007

The intelligence agencies said, Don't worry about the LTTE, they are our boys, they will not fight us



J N Dixit J N Dixit was India's high commissioner to Sri Lanka from 1985 to 1989. He played a major role in drafting the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in 1987, and the subsequent induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force to implement it.

Days after Indian troops arrived on the island, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam started what it was best at: guerrilla attacks in the jungles and shanty towns of north-east Lanka. It killed over 1,200 soldiers, maimed thousands, and forced the IPKF to abandon its task and retreat.

As then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi government's key man in Sri Lanka, Dixit was in the hot seat and privy to all the greenroom drama. Giving a clean chit to Gandhi, he blames the heavy casualties India suffered in the initial fighting for Jaffna on Major General Harkirat Singh, the IPKF's first commander.

Dixit spoke to Josy Joseph last fortnight:

It is 10 years since the IPKF withdrew. Was it rightly timed?

My view would be prejudiced. I think the Indian forces went to ensure the implementation of the agreement of July 1987, not to fight the Tamils or the Sinhalese. It was the LTTE that primarily created a situation that resulted in the Indian army having to fight them. And also, the Sri Lankan government ministers like Lalith Athulathamuthali and Premadasa, who sabotaged the agreement.

Despite these limitations, the Indian army did a very effective job of restoring stability, organising a democratic government in the north-eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. In my judgment, we withdrew in haste. Had we stayed on perhaps for eight months or a year, we could have perhaps stabilised the situation and generated sufficient persuasion on [LTTE chief Velupillai] Prabhakaran to come back to the political path.

We withdrew because the V P Singh government and then foreign minister Mr Gujral partially felt that they need to be legalistically correct: we were in a foreign country, the president of that country says "go away", and you come back.

The second thing is, there was a political motivation to prove Rajiv Gandhi was not right. But have the last 10 years shown the Sri Lankans got a better deal? Have the Tamils got anything better compared to what was provided for in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement? And most of it was implemented under the amendment of the 13th Sri Lankan government.

In fact, our troop-withdrawal resulted in erosion of the things which were beneficial to the Tamils. Sri Lanka sunk back into 10 years of violence. It sees no end even today. My view may be considered partisan because I was involved in the process as the high commissioner. Remarkable proof of it is: Renil Wickramasinghe, the present leader of the Opposition, has gone twice on record, once sometime in 1995 or 1996, and he told this to [then Indian prime minister P V] Narasimha Rao that he would like the Indian troops to come back.

The second thing, more than one Sri Lankan, Sinhalese and Tamil politician have acknowledged that the proposals in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement were the best compromise possible. They have become irrelevant because so much of violence occurred. New political terms have emerged.

On what basis do you say that had the IPKF stayed for a little more time it would have completed its mission?

Jaffna was pacified that it was under a civilian government. Trincomalee was pacified. Baticaloa and Ampare were pacified. LTTE cadres were pushed out of north-central Sri Lanka. They were all concentrated in a small place north of Vevunia jungles. Had we continued our military containment operation we could have persuaded them to surrender and give up violence.

More important than the withdrawal is the induction. Was it the right decision to send in the IPKF?

We didn't want to send troops, who said that? Sending the troops was not part of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Please understand. There was no thinking on the part of India to send armed forces into Sri Lanka during the negotiations and till the morning of the signing of the agreement on July 27. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Janatha Vimukti Peramuna organised wide-scale riots all over Colombo, it spread to the whole of Sinhalese areas in Sri Lanka in the morning a day before. On the morning the agreement was signed it became so violent that they went and burnt down the president's house somewhere south of Colombo.

President Jayewardane wanted to withdraw his troops from Jaffna to control the riots in the South. And it was he who said, "I want some Indian troops to come in to ensure security in Jaffna and Trincomalee because I am withdrawing my Sinhalese troops to maintain law and order here."

And Mr Rajiv Gandhi -- I was present -- said, Are you sure you want our troops? Because India can be criticised, Sri Lanka can be criticised. He said, I am going to give you a formal written invitation. Mr Gandhi said, Let us first sign the agreement, and then in your letter, if you think it is necessary, you say to ensure the efficient implementation of the agreement you want the troops. So it was a separate matter.

Did Gandhi's agreement to send in the troops surprise you?

No. It didn't. He was reluctant. Why should it surprise you? We had anticipated this possibility, so we had no qualms. 20, 30 days before, all sorts of contingencies were speculated upon by the army chief, intelligence, ministry of external affairs. There was no surprise.

This was one of the contingencies that you foresaw?

Yeah.

Did you expect them to fight?

No. How can you expect? But we had speculated on the possibility. I have said that in my book.

In your book you also admit to the fact that India sent in troops with inadequate briefing.

Yes, the army did not brief its own people why they were going in. But that is the armed force's responsibility. I had specifically asked [then army chief Krishnaswamy) Sunderji in the presence of Rajiv Gandhi, suppose you face a situation where you have to fight the LTTE, what will you do? He said, no, it will take a fortnight to take care of them. And the chief of intelligence said, These are our boys, once they have agreed they will not betray. Anand Verma said this to Rajiv Gandhi.

You think that was bad judgment?

Why blame one or the other? All of us who were involved are to be blamed. There was a certain... why certain, there was a very basic lack of judgment about what Prabhakaran's intentions were. There is a whole chapter in my book on how we failed. Read it. The whole chapter, totally uninhibited acknowledgement of where all we went wrong.

Did we underestimate the capabilities of the LTTE?

Yes. Perhaps we did. We did.

Intelligence agencies, did they come up with inputs?

Intelligence agencies did not analyse it from that point of view at all. They said these are boys who were trained by us from 1977 or whatever.

The LTTE?

All of them. Why the LTTE? All the 50 different groups. LTTE , EPRLF [Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front], all sorts. They did not look at it from that angle at all. They said these are our boys, we know them very well, they owe so much to us, so once they say yes, they will not fight us, they won't. That was their judgment.

More than a former foreign secretary you are an analyst of diplomacy and international affairs today. Was India's decision to train them wrong?

See, you do not indulge in value judgement, in retrospect, in hindsight. It is unrealistic. When you take a decision, you are in the middle of a situation. Nobody sitting in a chair 10 years later, five years later, is competent to judge whether it was necessary or not. Whether it was necessary or not was decided upon by the then government, then prime minister, on the basis of information and analysis that were available.

The army went in in 87. Between 77 and 85, [Indian prime minister] Mrs Gandhi would have been given information about all sorts of security equations, intelligence equations, that Jayewardane was developing with Pakistan, with Israel, with the Americans. Mind you, the Cold War had not ended. Plus, the compulsion of Mrs Gandhi was not only external, you have 60 million Tamils in your country. It is one of the most important states in our republic, and which has a history of secessionism. In 67 they threatened to separate on the question of language.

So she had take care of the sentiments of 60 million people who send out messages to her. In fact they went to the extent of saying that, Achcha, when the Bengalis were in trouble you gave support. When the Tamils are in trouble, because we are from the South, you are not giving us support. It is all easy to sit on moral judgment and say, No, no, we should not have done it, we should not have interfered, non-alignment, Mahatma Gandhi's country etc. The political pressures of that particular point of time must have made the then government consider it necessary. It is a different matter that it did not come through as we desired.

It did not come through as we desired because we did not have the grit to follow through a policy decision which we took. You have to look at it in two contexts: Either you are a totally committed moral country. In that case, you should have said that it is a problem of another country, it is an internal problem, do sort it out [yourself]. And to the extent possible, we will receive the refugees. Then you are safe and nice.

Or, because of consideration of our politics, and our internal political pressures, external consequences, we have taken an initiative that is strictly not moral. In that case, we should finish the task that has been undertaken. If you leave it half way, then you have the perceived lack of judgment, lack of performance. This is what has happened. You think we did not take the position regarding Bangladesh, there also we interfered many times. What happened in the Maldives, where we finished the operation in two-and-a-half days and came back?

If you look at the newspapers of the first two-and-a-half months, from July to October, the Indian papers were full of praise. Even the Americans came and told the Government of India that you assume responsibilities which are yours, we are glad. The moment you do not do it fully, everybody will say that you are no good.

Did the V P Singh government consult you while withdrawing troops?

They didn't consult any one of us. They had a two-point programme. We must be given a certificate for being a very good non-aligned, great non-interfering country. And second, we must do things exactly opposite to what Rajiv Gandhi did.

Did you feel bad that an expert hand on Lanka like you was ignored?

Why should I feel bad? I am a professional. Why should I feel bad? I was not even dealing with Sri Lanka then. I was the high commissioner in Pakistan. You do a job to the best of your ability in a particular assignment and when you move away from it somebody will continue. In my profession, there is no place for emotions. The only thing emotional about my profession is hopefully a very deep commitment to India. That is the only thing. In my judgment, the IPKF going in was in India's interest.

But once the IPKF entered we suffered humiliating casualties.

That was the foolishness of [IPKF's first commander, Major General] Harkirat Singh. You don't do a helicopter attack in full moonlight after giving advance notice to the enemy.

Was the army aware that the LTTE could intercept its messages?

Of course they were. [But] He [Major General Harkirat Singh] was a most inept general. The first general there was the most inept fellow.

Do you think the death of over 600 soldiers in a most gruesome manner during the initial fighting for Jaffna could have been avoided?

Much of it could have been avoided.

Did Major General Harkirat Singh come down to you for any briefings, discussions?

Once in August, and once perhaps in September with General Sunderji. No, not Sunderji, Mr K C Pant. He never came otherwise. In fact, he was so wooden that when those fellows where arrested and brought to the Palami airbase, I told them to take them into protective custody and not let the Sri Lankan authorities get to the LTTE cadre.

The fellow said, No, no you are not in my chain of command. Please don't tell me. You first send it to the ministry of external affairs, they should send it to the ministry of defence, they should send it to army headquarters, they should send it to Southern Command. Then Southern Command should tell Madras. Then they should tell me, then only I will act. I said, By then the game will be over. I am telling you I am fully responsible. No, I will not do it, he said. The result was that the 17 fellows were killed.

That added to the LTTE anger?

That is the origin of where we had to fight the LTTE. The LTTE got an excuse. [Thanks to] this man's foolishness.

Friday, November 16, 2007

Colombo-Kandy: From footpath to expressway -JP




In 1972, Ceylon Observer Features Editor Eustace Rulach satirised Sri Lanka’s road and transport system in an article titled, `Tourist Ceylon in the year 2072.’ It is about a group of foreigners travelling from Colombo by tourist coach to the Katunayake airport. Two hours later, the tired and shaken passengers clamber off the coaches. One elderly tourist tells another, “I heard my grandpa talk about this trip to the airport from the city, and that it took longer than the flight to Bangkok. My God! That was eighty years ago, and I thought he was joking!”

Our road conditions are not far different today from what they were in 1972 owing to the increasing volume of vehicular traffic. Sri Lanka’s annual loss due to faulty road systems is around Rs.200 billion, according to a survey that the Moratuwa University conducted a few years ago. Needless to say this problem will continue until the planned network of expressways linking the country’s major towns and cities are completed.

How did our grand parents and their elders cope with such situations? To begin with they did not face the transport difficulties we face today. There were four very good reasons for this: (1) life moved at a much lower pace and people travelled less (2) an excellent railway system that was almost never hampered by work stoppages or strikes (3) there was far less vehicular traffic on the highways and (4) towns were much less congested. In the very early part of the last Century, the Galle-Colombo road - say from Moratuwa to Pettah - was half the width of what the same stretch is today.

There were no motor vehicles in Sri Lanka and most parts of the world until the beginning of the 20th Century since the first petrol-driven automobile was invented only in1885. Although the Dutch (1658-1796) constructed a network of roads encircling the island’s coastal belt this country’s most important road - the Colombo-Kandy highway - was built only after the Kandyan Kingdom fell to the British.

But around 2000 years ago at the peak of the ancient Sinhala civilization our kings did construct some excellent roads and mileposts some of which were discovered in Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. These however were built long before Sri Lanka’s encounter with the Western powers and the subsequent establishment of the Kandyan kingdom.

Following the European occupation of the Maritime Provinces the Kandyan Kings did not allow the building of any roadways linking the hill country with the low lands for a very good reason. The non-existence of a road network made it extremely difficult for the foreign forces occupying the coastal areas to reach the hill capital. The jungle bordering the kingdom was kept thick and only footpaths were allowed to penetrate it.
This environment was ideal for waging guerilla warfare against any invader. The policy made good dividends in an age when ox caravans, horse-back and palanquins were the principle means of transport.

At the time it took as long as 10 days to reach Kandy along the cart-track-cum-foot path from Colombo whereas today it is a matter of two-and-a-half-hour journey by motor vehicle or train.

When the British decided to open up the jungle and build a roadway it was primarily for military purposes rather than for public use. Later with the dawn of the coffee era the road began to serve commercial objectives as well.

The credit for the construction of the Colombo-Kandy road goes to Governor Sir Edward Barnes who assumed office in 1820. While the first sod was cut in 1820 and the trail was completed in 1821, the road was not open to traffic until 1825. Even then it had a few culverts and bridges that were not completed until 1833 and the metalling was not begun until 1841.

Contract labour was employed to build the part of the road which went through the low country. This work was under the direction of Captain Frazer who was noted for his lurid language. When complaints were made against him Governor Barnes responded by saying that Frazer was just the man for the job since it required a person who was willing to “dam the streams” and “blast the rocks.”

Another military officer, Major Skinner was appointed to build a portion of the Kandy Road from Ampitiya to Warakapola, just above the half-way mark. He noted in his diary that the natives with whom he had to work were “totally unskilled labourers who had never seen a yard of made road in the country, for the best of reasons that such a thing did not exist”.

The villagers that Skinner mentions were working under a system inherited from the Sinhala Rajakariya system, under which the tenant of a property might be required to do two-weeks work for the State. A similar system prevailed in England in the Middle-Ages. Since labour was not paid, it was necessarily inefficient. Even worse was that the whole labour force changed every two weeks and a new labour force had to be taught how to exactly set about working.

This system, which was abolished in 1832, was going on all along the Kandyroad though there was also a Corps of Pioneers recruited for the purpose. Skinner’s fellow officers were a cheerful hard-working crowd and it appears that some of them died due to excessive drinking rather than by accidents during road building.

A bigger menace was malaria - called ‘jungle fever’ in those days since its connection with the mosquito was then unknown. Building the road to the hill country literally became an uphill task since every night wild elephants broke down the embankments. In addition marshes, quagmires, swamps, pools and puddles posed a major challenge to the engineers and workers. But completed the road was enabling travellers to get to Kandy within a day by horse-drawn carriage.

While the road was under construction in 1822 a pontoon bridge was thrown across the Kelani River to span it at Grandpass. This bridge carried all the traffic that passed the point until the Victoria Bridge was opened for traffic in 1895.

The Gordon Bridge across the Hingula Oya was completed in 1822 and a few other minor bridges too came up by 1825. Two other important bridges - one across the Maha Oya at Mawanella and the other across the Mahaweli Ganga at Peradeniya were both completed in 1832.

The latter was of course spanned by the famous Wedge Bridge comprising one single span of 250 feet. Although it was to be done entirely of satin-wood some milla was substituted for its lower ribs during the latter part of the construction due to a shortage of satin wood. However it did not reduce its value for it was a piece of master-craftsmanship.

This was designed on the instructions of Lt. General John Frazer based on the system of wedge bridges. The bridge was constructed in Colombo and on completion transported to Peradeniya where it was erected by Captain A. Brown without a single nut or bolt of any kind!

This too withstood all the traffic for 72 long years until an iron structure replaced it in 1905. A model of this satin-wood bridge was taken to be exhibited permanently in the South Kensington Museum in London.After the Kandy Road was opened to the public, toll points (a modern day feature in developed countries) were established at the bridge of boats at Grandpass, Atulugama, Ambepussa Bridge, Anguruwella, Kadugannawa Pass and the Peradeniya Bridge.

No uniformity of rates prevailed in the early period and occasionally it led to confusion and exploitation of road users. To rectify this defect an Ordinance titled, “For establishing an uniform rate of tolls on the road from Colombo to Kandy...” was passed in 1841. These tolls were chargeable upon passengers, carts, carriages, cattle and other animals and goods. There were also concessions to certain people enumerated in the Ordinance and the Government Agent was the proper authority to direct the toll-keepers in writing to permit cattle driven to grass, persons with agricultural implements or with seed grain to cultivate their land and school children to and fro, to pass a point.

The Colombo-Kandy Road ended the Hill Capital’s virtual isolation from the rest of the country. It also brought a new source of revenue to the Colonial Government as well as immense wealth to several hundred entrepreneurs with the opening up of land for coffee cultivation, soon afterwards. The dawn of the motor vehicle era, saw a mixture of both old and new modes of transport on the Colombo-Kandy Road as elsewhere. These included what we today call ‘old crocks’ or vintage cars and buses with rubber (bulb) horns, long footboards and cranks (used for starting the engine), bullock carts, horse-drawn carriages and ox-drawn buggies.

Lake House was among the companies that operated a Colombo-Kandy bus service beginning in the 1920s. Horse drawn carriages continued to ply on our roads till about the late 1930s. However even in the mid 1950s I remember seeing as a child a few pony-drawn carriages in the Anuradhapura town.

The length of the island’s road network today is about 92700 km. The roads linking the provinces belong to the A class while those connecting the districts belong to B class. These roads are 11600 km in total length. The roads belong to the C, D and E categories are 16500 km long and unclassified roads are 64000 km.
New challenges - however - are bound to occur with the completion of expressways. . The problem however is that neither the police nor the emergency rescue services, pedestrians’ and local residents, are aware of road safety issues linked to super highways of this type.

According to Romesh Fernando, a one-time public awareness specialist at a Swedish consultancy firm, such expressways will require new facilities such as emergency phones at regular intervals to alert traffic police and emergency services. New regulations, he states, would also be necessary to facilitate the use of seat belts, speed control in designated lanes and the halting of vehicles.

Sunday, November 11, 2007

Muhamalai : The attack and the withdrawal

* Troops pull back after pre-dawn offensive, toll on both sides
* Peace prospects plunge further as undeclared war intensifies

By Iqbal Athas

One of the vagaries of war in any part of the world is how successes and failures follow each other. However, in Sri Lanka this axiom assumes greater significance. It speaks of how the undeclared Eelam War IV is intensifying to higher levels. That is notwithstanding the three mechanisms put in place to prevent such escalation. They are the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002, the resultant presence of Scandinavian monitors to oversee it and the peace process. All three, it appears, are breathing their last. Both the Government and the Tiger guerrillas have clearly defined themselves to fight it out as events of the recent weeks clearly show.

Before the crack of dawn on Wednesday, troops broke out from their defended localities astride Muhamalai. It lay on the northern end of the thin isthmus that links mainland Sri Lanka to the Jaffna peninsula. The entry exit point or the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula from the Wanni is located almost in the middle of this defence line. Artillery began to rain on guerrilla positions. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) located in the rear of the advancing troops also fired at guerrilla targets. Giving air cover were Mi-24 helicopter gun-ships of the Air Force.
SHOWING OFF THEIR HARDWARE: Tiger guerrilla cadres displaying Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) on their launchers at the funeral of their political wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan in the Wanni last Monday.

Their mission was to advance in the direction of Kilinochchi, the guerrilla heartland by seizing territory dominated by them. They smashed through the first line of guerrilla defences and advanced. Dawn had broken. Rear elements were holding the bunkers and the lengthy mound that formed their defences. Their colleagues forged ahead.

The guerrillas retaliated with mortar, machine gun, rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire. Fierce gun battles ensued. This is where the grit and valour of the brave troops was exhibited in abundance. Some of them came to the aid of their colleagues who were either hit by gunfire or were trapped. Troops soon realised that the guerrillas had allowed them to advance some distance before offering heavy resistance. A tactical withdrawal became necessary. Therefore, they made a gradual pull back. They had to give up the guerrilla defence line they were holding for over an hour.

There is no gainsaying that troops from seven battalions that took part in the offensive were bold enough to thrust their way forward. In war, making tactical withdrawals in the light of enemy surprises or traps is quite common. That is how they re-group, re-arm and ready themselves to fight another day. The elements involved in the operation are: 4th battalion, Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI), 7th battalion Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR), 5th battalion Gemunu Watch GW), 1st battalion Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR), 6th battalion Sri Lanka Army Field Engineers, 1st battalion Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI) and 4th battalion Gemunu Watch (GW).

It would have been different if the troops did succeed in capturing guerrilla held terrain south of the Muhamalai defence lines. This is one occasion when the country would have known the good news within minutes. There is no doubt President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was reading the budget speech heard and seen live on television by millions of Sri Lankans would have interrupted the budget speech to make it known. That was not to be. Troops who broke out around 5.30 a.m. were back in the original positions in some three hours.

Official accounts said 11 soldiers were killed and 41 injured. However, details obtained by The Sunday Times show the figures are higher. They cannot be revealed. It is not because of earning the Government's crowning honour of being a "traitor." In this instance, the disclosure could endanger sources. That is at a time when a major hunt is on, through various channels and various means, to identify sources. According to ground troops, military officials say, 50 to 60 Tiger guerrillas were killed. They said that radio intercepts had shown that the guerrillas had called for "five to six" vehicles for casualty evacuation. The guerrillas also tried to hide their casualty counts by claiming that only one cadre was killed. However, independent verification of guerrilla deaths and injuries is not possible.

Since the ceasefire of 2002, this is the second time that the military made a major thrust to advance towards guerrilla territory from the Muhamalai defences. The first came on October 11, last year, when troops backed by battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers advanced from Muhamalai. (Situation Report - October 15 2006). Kfir gournd attack aircraft then bombed guerrilla targets. Figures published in The Sunday Times after this offensive showed that 133 soldiers were killed. A further 483 were injured, among them 283 described as P1 or serious cases.

Since the Government formally announced that it had re-captured the entirety of the Eastern Province after driving the guerrillas out, military activity has centred in the North. Until last Wednesday's offensive, troops have been fighting bitter battles on the western side of their defended localities in Omanthai since July this year. The guerrillas have been offering stiff resistance. Periodic skirmishes still continue.

The cycle of events in the recent weeks portend a grim picture both in respect of war and peace. On October 15 the guerrillas attacked the Army's detachment at Talgasmankada in the Yala National Park. This was followed up, just a week later, with a devastating pre-dawn attack on the Sri Lanka Air Force base in Anuradhapura on October 22. The two incidents came just weeks ahead of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran's "Maveerar(Great Heroes) Day" address on November 27. It was not only to demonstrate that the guerrillas had not lost their military capability. It was also to catalogue the attacks to drive home a point.

However, the gloss of that campaign was lost when the Sri Lanka Air Force dropped bombs at a building near the Kilinochchi town on November 2. That killed LTTE Political Wing leader, Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan, his confidante Alex (Anpumani) and four others. A sixth died later. In its campaign against the Tiger guerrillas, it was a victory for the Government. The political leadership were happy that a prize target has been taken. However, in the Wanni, it appears to have altered course.

LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran declared that in killing Mr. Thamilselvan, the Government had killed the "dove of peace." T. Shivashankar, better known as Pottu Amman gave the main oration at Thamilselvan's funeral. He is the head of the LTTE intelligence wing, one of the most wanted men in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, one time Prime Minister of India. Heads of intelligence service, be it from the state or those from non-state entities, seldom make public appearances or pose for photographs. In this case, Pottu Amman made his speech wearing Tiger stripe uniform and a cap on his head.

He blamed the international community for what he called their uneven judgement in applying norms to the LTTE and the Government. "A few Sri Lankan soldiers, perhaps thousands, or a few Sinhala leaders cannot match the price for Thamilselvan. The relentless efforts to achieve Tamil Eelam is the price. The Sinhala nation should realise that we will never stop in this effort," he had declared according to a report in the Tamilnet web site.

Former Sri Lanka policeman, P. Nadesan, who has succeeded as head of the LTTE Political Wing took a swipe at Norway, the peace facilitator. He said "the official silence of peace facilitator Norway, in regard to the killing of Thamilselvan, is viewed with serious concern and is regretted by the Tamil population and the Tigers." The remarks came despite statements by Erik Solheim, Minister for International Development and the Special Envoy, Jon Hansen Bauer. The latter had in fact taken part in a ceremony in Oslo to condole the death of the LTTE political wing leader.

Added to these are editorial comments and commentaries in a number of pro-LTTE newspapers and websites criticising the international community. Whilst there is no doubt the LTTE will now step up offensive action, the question that begs answer is whether it is laying the groundwork to veer away from what remains of the peace process.

Would that mean walking out of the Ceasefire Agreement? Such a move would, in accordance with the CFA, require two-weeks notice be given to the peace facilitator. On the other hand, even if they do not quit the CFA, in the backdrop of the new developments, the likelihood of the LTTE responding to any peace initiatives appears extremely remote.

This naturally brings to question the Government's own response. The Government has repeatedly assured several countries, particularly neighbouring India, that proposals to end the ethnic conflict would soon be formulated by the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). These proposals have been delayed periodically and there is speculation now of it being made public by January, next year. How viable would such proposals be in the light of the new Tiger guerrilla stance to step up attacks?

The Government would have to equip the Armed Forces and the Police further to meet the newer and growing threats. On Friday, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake told Parliament a Joint Operations Centre would be set up in Tissamaharama to co-ordinate security in that area. This is the outcome of the guerrilla attack inside Yala national park and subsequent reports of killings of civilians in a bordering village.

Yala and its environs earlier came under the Army's Area Headquarters in Galle. Thereafter, in February, last year, a sub area headquarters was set up in Hambantota. Colonel Anura Wijekoon was placed in charge. Now, Brigadier Sudantha Ranasinghe has been named as Area Commander Hambantota.
The above is one of Chinese built PT-6 trainer aicraft damaged during the Tiger guerrilla attack on the Anuradhapura airbase on October 22. It was erroneously identified as a K-8 intermediate jet trainer by us last week. The error is regretted.

This week, Army Headquarters named Major General Upali Edirisinghe as General Officer Commanding (GOC) the 11 Division of the Army. He was Director-General General Staff at Army Headquarters. The Chief of Staff, Major General Lawrence Fernando, will now overlook the post of DGGS. This Division covers the Yala National Park area too. He succeeds Major General Sanath Karunaratne, who is now Military Co-ordinating Officer for the Anuradhapura District.

I had erred last week in wrongly identifying an Air Force Chinese built PT-6 as a K-8 intermediate jet trainer and the tail of an Mi-17 as that on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The picture of the PT-6 is published on this page again today with the correct caption. I apologise to readers of The Sunday Times for this mistake.

The ebullient defence spokesperson and Minister of Foreign Employment, Keheliya Rambukwella, was waxing eloquent at Monday's news conference at the Media Centre for National Security. Almost at the end of the event in what seemed an afterthought, he waved the Situation Report page in The Sunday Times and declared that the "expert in defence reporting" cannot even identify an aircraft. Once again, I had honorary mention in the defence.lk website too.

At a time when his compatriots in the defence establishment have chosen to call me a "traitor," the title of "expert" from Mr. Rambukwella is worthy indeed. I thank him for that. Yet, I have never claimed to be an expert and will not do so in the future too. I would only say I have been a student who has witnessed the transition from Tamil moderation to militancy since its inception in the 1970s.

A placard carried by a demonstrator who staged a protest near my house, organised by sections of the Government, in August, this year, after I exposed the controversial MiG-27 procurement deal declared I am "only a journalist." Indeed I am. Like all others, I make mistakes. However, I am never hesitant to correct them when I realise there has been one. I have often emphasised this in previous Situation Reports.

This brings us to the question of aircraft/helicopters/UAVs destroyed or damaged during the October 22 attack. Details are now unfolding before a six-member Air Force Court of Inquiry headed by Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra. Other members are Air Commodore B.L.W. Balasuriya, Group Captain Lal Perera, Group Captain W.A. Nanayakkara, Wing Commander Nissanka Jayawardena and Wing Commander Prasanna Ekanayake. Another Air Force Court of Inquiry headed by Group Captain Royce Gunaratna is probing the crash of the Bell 212 helicopter at Doramadalawa in Mihintale.

It is established that the following were destroyed : Two Mil Mi-17 helicopters, one 206 Bell Jetranger, a Beechcraft, one Chinese built K-8 trainer, one Mi-24 helicopter gun-ship, two Chinese built PT-6 trainers and two brand new Blue Horizon II UAVs. The latter is not part of the Air Force assets and belonged to an Israeli supplier. They were to be flight tested on October 26 but the attack had occurred earlier. This is in addition to the Bell-212 helicopter that crashed.

The task before the Court of Inquiry headed by Air Vice Marshal Premachandra, among other matters, is to determine which of the damaged SLAF assets are economically viable to be repaired. The rest would thus become junk. That will include five PT-6 trainers inside the hangar that have been exposed to the heat from anti tank fire or grenade attack.

The extreme heat came from the Mi-17 and the Bell Jetranger 206 that were set ablaze. Some were partly burnt. The perspex canopies have melted.

Another is the Searcher Mk II UAV. Its two wings had been damaged and the engine cowlings made out of fibreglass warped. Four Cessna 150s that belonged to the Air Force have also been damaged. The four SF 260 TP Siai Marchetti bombers are not being considered a financial loss since they were unserviceable and lay parked there. Together with three Mi-17 helicopters that were not damaged, the total number of Air Force assets at the Anuradhapura airbase was thus 30.

Acts of bravery by some of the airmen during the guerrilla attack on the airbase are now unfolding before the SLAF Court of Inquiry. One of the heroes is an Air Force Corporal who stood near the Control Tower and took a number of hits with his sniper rifle. He is said to have killed at least eight intruding guerrillas. Some of them had detonated their 'suicide belts' and died on the runway.

Members of the tri service Court of Inquiry headed by the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, visited the airbase last weekend. They interviewed officers and other ranks besides making an on-the-spot study on how the defences were breached. A more extended inquiry into all aspects is being conducted by the Criminal Investigation Department. That is under the direct charge of D.W. Prathapasinghe, DIG (CID).

Whilst several probes are under way to identify lapses that led to the devastating attack at the Anuradhapura airbase, the task of enhancing security measures in most parts of the country has fallen on the security establishment. As the guerrillas plan to trigger off more attacks, some ahead of their "great heroes" day, maintaining vigilance at the highest level has become the undaunting task for Security Forces and the Police.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/071111/Columns/sitreport.html

Thursday, November 8, 2007

Prabhakaran has no one to blame but himself








Monday, 5 November 2007 - 12:32 PM SL Time

LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is mourning his political wing leader S. P. Tamilselvam, who perished in an air raid on Friday together with five others. There are two schools of thought about that killing.

One is that the Sri Lanka Air Force mounted that decapitation strike using intelligence it had gathered on its own it had identified the target weeks ago but desisted from taking it until time was opportune. And the Tigers struck in Anuradhapura. Others argue that Tamilselvam`s enemies within the LTTE leaked information about his hideout, as he had fallen out with the leadership towards his tragic end.

Prabhakaran, as his history reveals, knows more than one way to skin a Tiger, according to the second school of thought. He, as is well known, doesn`t tolerate dissent and goes to any extent to remove from his path anyone who, he thinks, will be a threat to his leadership one day. The de facto deputy leader of the LTTE Mahattaya or Mahendraraja became too popular within the organisation and it was expected that he would one day succeed Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran got him `arrested`, kept in a dungeon and finally murdered together with over 200 of his loyalists. Prabhakaran is also said to have betrayed Kuttumani because he was perceived as a threat. Kuttumani was arrested on a tip-off from the LTTE itself and later killed in the then UNP government-instigated prison riots in 1983. Prabhakaran`s rivals still have serious doubts about how a vessel with Kittu, another popular LTTE leader, on board came to be intercepted in 1993, causing his death. More recently, immediately before Karuna`s breakaway, Prabhakaran sent for both Paduman and Karuna and the SLMM arranged for their travel to the Wanni. An SLAF chopper picked up Paduman from Trincomalee and proceeded to Batticaloa, where Karuna was to board it. Karuna had second thoughts and refused to join Paduman. That was the last seen of Paduman, who is believed to be either killed or incarcerated in the Wanni as his loyalty to Prabhakaran was in question.

The conspiracy theorists claim that Prabhakaran`s decision to groom his son for leadership has resulted in a bitter power struggle and that led to the information leak in question. The battles fought between Sea Tiger chief Soosai`s faction and Pottu Amman`s loyalists in Scandinavia, they say, demonstrate how serious the LTTE`s crisis is.

This view is, however, disputed by the other school of thought, which insists that the full credit should be given to the SLAF for the successful surgical strike mounted after months of intelligence gathering. Military intelligence, the proponents of this view point out, has successfully broken into the inner cells of the LTTE. Even before Tamilselvam fell out with Prabhakaran, they argue, the army long rangers had almost accounted for him, with the benefit of accurate information about his movements and, therefore, Friday`s attack was something to be expected. They ask why on earth the Prabhakaran faction should have helped the SLAF gain mileage with a devastating airstrike and boost its morale in the aftermath of the Anuradhapura debacle. Friday`s air raid also destroyed sophisticated communication equipment belonging to the LTTE, they say, and therefore it is not possible that the LTTE leadership had a hand in the tip-off. Prabhakaran, they argue, could have clipped Tamilselvam`s wings further and relegated him to obscurity after promoting another person for that job, without enabling the SLAF to overshadow the Anuradhapura attack. This argument, we reckon, is tenable. Else, the Tiger leadership wouldn`t have been so rattled and paranoid in the aftermath of the attack.

`Our people are in profound shock and sorrow,` Prabhakaran has said of Tamilsevlam`s death in a condolence message, describing him as a true leader loved by the people and respected by the international community. De mortuis nil nisi bonum! But, it needs to be added that Tamilselvam was no saint. He was a military man with a political face. That`s why he was promoted to the rank of `Brigadier` posthumously. Remember it was he who threatened to destroy targets in the South following the fall of Thoppigala.

Tamilselvam was only a dwarf in comparison to the Tamil political leaders and intellectuals the LTTE has assassinated such as Amirthalingam, Rajini, Neelan, Yogeswaran, Sarojini, Padmanabha and Kadir. The LTTE also assassinated President Premadasa, Gamini and Lalith and almost accounted for President Kumaratunga. In India, it assassinated Rajiv.

Tamilselvam is the highest ranking LTTE leader to have been killed after the pioneer of the LTTE`s crude air wing and Prabhakaran`s personal friend Shankar, who died in an army long ranger attack about six years ago. His killing made Prabhakaran confine himself to his well fortified bunker all the time and opt for a truce, which was also partly due to the fallout of the 9/11 attacks. He was so frightened that he got the Norwegians to insert a special section into the CFA prohibiting deep penetration operations. The UNF government played into his hands by raiding the safe house of the long rangers at Athurugiriya and divulging their identities. The LTTE decimated the entire intelligence network that the deep penetration unit had painstakingly put in place over so many years. But, the long rangers are said to be back in action in the Wanni.

What Prabhakaran urgently needs at this juncture is a breather. His ammunition stocks are running out with no hope of replenishment due to the effective blockade by the Navy, which has sunk as many as eight arms smuggling vessels for the past thirteen months. Now that the army is poised to march on the Wanni and the military intelligence has outsmarted Pottu Amman`s outfit?some foreign defence analysts with a soft corner for the LTTE have warned that the LTTE leader is vulnerable to airstrikes as never before?Prabhakaran might wave an olive branch as a tactical ploy the way he did in 2001, contrary to the belief that he will go all out to inflict heavy damage on the military in retaliation for Tamilselvam`s death.

His message on the killing is devoid of usual threats. It is more an appeal for the consumption of the international community. `Despite the repeated and continuous calls from the international community to find a peaceful resolution to Tamil national question,` Prabhakran has said, `we have not seen any goodwill from the Sinhala nation.` (Emphasis added). He has given something to the peace lobby to hold on to. It will be interesting to see what he has got to say in his `heroes` day`speech which is due shortly.

Prabhakaran has no way of absolving himself of the responsibility for Tamilselvam`s death. But for his decision to plunge the country back into war last year by capturing the Mavil Aru anicut, Tamilselvam would still have been smiling in Kilinochchi, `loved by the people and respected by the international community` as he says.

Having suffered a string of humiliating defeats, Prabhakaran had just scored a win, when disaster struck. Worse, he has run short of surprises for the Sri Lankan state. He has attacked almost every economic or military target from the Central Bank to the Katunayaka airbase killed a President, a service commander and a large number of political and military leaders partly destroyed the main oil installation committed a large number of massacres and blown up civilian targets. But, he has not got anywhere near his goal. Instead, he has to live in eternal fear, encircled in the Wanni with the army threatening to move in any moment. His arms smuggling network is in tatters and intelligence wing has been wrong-footed.

A prisoner of his own violence, Prabhakaran has had to begin from the very beginning after two decades of fighting. He has no one to blame but himself.