Muhamalai : The attack and the withdrawal

* Troops pull back after pre-dawn offensive, toll on both sides
* Peace prospects plunge further as undeclared war intensifies

By Iqbal Athas

One of the vagaries of war in any part of the world is how successes and failures follow each other. However, in Sri Lanka this axiom assumes greater significance. It speaks of how the undeclared Eelam War IV is intensifying to higher levels. That is notwithstanding the three mechanisms put in place to prevent such escalation. They are the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002, the resultant presence of Scandinavian monitors to oversee it and the peace process. All three, it appears, are breathing their last. Both the Government and the Tiger guerrillas have clearly defined themselves to fight it out as events of the recent weeks clearly show.

Before the crack of dawn on Wednesday, troops broke out from their defended localities astride Muhamalai. It lay on the northern end of the thin isthmus that links mainland Sri Lanka to the Jaffna peninsula. The entry exit point or the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula from the Wanni is located almost in the middle of this defence line. Artillery began to rain on guerrilla positions. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) located in the rear of the advancing troops also fired at guerrilla targets. Giving air cover were Mi-24 helicopter gun-ships of the Air Force.
SHOWING OFF THEIR HARDWARE: Tiger guerrilla cadres displaying Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) on their launchers at the funeral of their political wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan in the Wanni last Monday.

Their mission was to advance in the direction of Kilinochchi, the guerrilla heartland by seizing territory dominated by them. They smashed through the first line of guerrilla defences and advanced. Dawn had broken. Rear elements were holding the bunkers and the lengthy mound that formed their defences. Their colleagues forged ahead.

The guerrillas retaliated with mortar, machine gun, rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire. Fierce gun battles ensued. This is where the grit and valour of the brave troops was exhibited in abundance. Some of them came to the aid of their colleagues who were either hit by gunfire or were trapped. Troops soon realised that the guerrillas had allowed them to advance some distance before offering heavy resistance. A tactical withdrawal became necessary. Therefore, they made a gradual pull back. They had to give up the guerrilla defence line they were holding for over an hour.

There is no gainsaying that troops from seven battalions that took part in the offensive were bold enough to thrust their way forward. In war, making tactical withdrawals in the light of enemy surprises or traps is quite common. That is how they re-group, re-arm and ready themselves to fight another day. The elements involved in the operation are: 4th battalion, Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI), 7th battalion Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR), 5th battalion Gemunu Watch GW), 1st battalion Vijayaba Infantry Regiment (VIR), 6th battalion Sri Lanka Army Field Engineers, 1st battalion Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI) and 4th battalion Gemunu Watch (GW).

It would have been different if the troops did succeed in capturing guerrilla held terrain south of the Muhamalai defence lines. This is one occasion when the country would have known the good news within minutes. There is no doubt President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was reading the budget speech heard and seen live on television by millions of Sri Lankans would have interrupted the budget speech to make it known. That was not to be. Troops who broke out around 5.30 a.m. were back in the original positions in some three hours.

Official accounts said 11 soldiers were killed and 41 injured. However, details obtained by The Sunday Times show the figures are higher. They cannot be revealed. It is not because of earning the Government's crowning honour of being a "traitor." In this instance, the disclosure could endanger sources. That is at a time when a major hunt is on, through various channels and various means, to identify sources. According to ground troops, military officials say, 50 to 60 Tiger guerrillas were killed. They said that radio intercepts had shown that the guerrillas had called for "five to six" vehicles for casualty evacuation. The guerrillas also tried to hide their casualty counts by claiming that only one cadre was killed. However, independent verification of guerrilla deaths and injuries is not possible.

Since the ceasefire of 2002, this is the second time that the military made a major thrust to advance towards guerrilla territory from the Muhamalai defences. The first came on October 11, last year, when troops backed by battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers advanced from Muhamalai. (Situation Report - October 15 2006). Kfir gournd attack aircraft then bombed guerrilla targets. Figures published in The Sunday Times after this offensive showed that 133 soldiers were killed. A further 483 were injured, among them 283 described as P1 or serious cases.

Since the Government formally announced that it had re-captured the entirety of the Eastern Province after driving the guerrillas out, military activity has centred in the North. Until last Wednesday's offensive, troops have been fighting bitter battles on the western side of their defended localities in Omanthai since July this year. The guerrillas have been offering stiff resistance. Periodic skirmishes still continue.

The cycle of events in the recent weeks portend a grim picture both in respect of war and peace. On October 15 the guerrillas attacked the Army's detachment at Talgasmankada in the Yala National Park. This was followed up, just a week later, with a devastating pre-dawn attack on the Sri Lanka Air Force base in Anuradhapura on October 22. The two incidents came just weeks ahead of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran's "Maveerar(Great Heroes) Day" address on November 27. It was not only to demonstrate that the guerrillas had not lost their military capability. It was also to catalogue the attacks to drive home a point.

However, the gloss of that campaign was lost when the Sri Lanka Air Force dropped bombs at a building near the Kilinochchi town on November 2. That killed LTTE Political Wing leader, Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan, his confidante Alex (Anpumani) and four others. A sixth died later. In its campaign against the Tiger guerrillas, it was a victory for the Government. The political leadership were happy that a prize target has been taken. However, in the Wanni, it appears to have altered course.

LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran declared that in killing Mr. Thamilselvan, the Government had killed the "dove of peace." T. Shivashankar, better known as Pottu Amman gave the main oration at Thamilselvan's funeral. He is the head of the LTTE intelligence wing, one of the most wanted men in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, one time Prime Minister of India. Heads of intelligence service, be it from the state or those from non-state entities, seldom make public appearances or pose for photographs. In this case, Pottu Amman made his speech wearing Tiger stripe uniform and a cap on his head.

He blamed the international community for what he called their uneven judgement in applying norms to the LTTE and the Government. "A few Sri Lankan soldiers, perhaps thousands, or a few Sinhala leaders cannot match the price for Thamilselvan. The relentless efforts to achieve Tamil Eelam is the price. The Sinhala nation should realise that we will never stop in this effort," he had declared according to a report in the Tamilnet web site.

Former Sri Lanka policeman, P. Nadesan, who has succeeded as head of the LTTE Political Wing took a swipe at Norway, the peace facilitator. He said "the official silence of peace facilitator Norway, in regard to the killing of Thamilselvan, is viewed with serious concern and is regretted by the Tamil population and the Tigers." The remarks came despite statements by Erik Solheim, Minister for International Development and the Special Envoy, Jon Hansen Bauer. The latter had in fact taken part in a ceremony in Oslo to condole the death of the LTTE political wing leader.

Added to these are editorial comments and commentaries in a number of pro-LTTE newspapers and websites criticising the international community. Whilst there is no doubt the LTTE will now step up offensive action, the question that begs answer is whether it is laying the groundwork to veer away from what remains of the peace process.

Would that mean walking out of the Ceasefire Agreement? Such a move would, in accordance with the CFA, require two-weeks notice be given to the peace facilitator. On the other hand, even if they do not quit the CFA, in the backdrop of the new developments, the likelihood of the LTTE responding to any peace initiatives appears extremely remote.

This naturally brings to question the Government's own response. The Government has repeatedly assured several countries, particularly neighbouring India, that proposals to end the ethnic conflict would soon be formulated by the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). These proposals have been delayed periodically and there is speculation now of it being made public by January, next year. How viable would such proposals be in the light of the new Tiger guerrilla stance to step up attacks?

The Government would have to equip the Armed Forces and the Police further to meet the newer and growing threats. On Friday, Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake told Parliament a Joint Operations Centre would be set up in Tissamaharama to co-ordinate security in that area. This is the outcome of the guerrilla attack inside Yala national park and subsequent reports of killings of civilians in a bordering village.

Yala and its environs earlier came under the Army's Area Headquarters in Galle. Thereafter, in February, last year, a sub area headquarters was set up in Hambantota. Colonel Anura Wijekoon was placed in charge. Now, Brigadier Sudantha Ranasinghe has been named as Area Commander Hambantota.
The above is one of Chinese built PT-6 trainer aicraft damaged during the Tiger guerrilla attack on the Anuradhapura airbase on October 22. It was erroneously identified as a K-8 intermediate jet trainer by us last week. The error is regretted.

This week, Army Headquarters named Major General Upali Edirisinghe as General Officer Commanding (GOC) the 11 Division of the Army. He was Director-General General Staff at Army Headquarters. The Chief of Staff, Major General Lawrence Fernando, will now overlook the post of DGGS. This Division covers the Yala National Park area too. He succeeds Major General Sanath Karunaratne, who is now Military Co-ordinating Officer for the Anuradhapura District.

I had erred last week in wrongly identifying an Air Force Chinese built PT-6 as a K-8 intermediate jet trainer and the tail of an Mi-17 as that on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The picture of the PT-6 is published on this page again today with the correct caption. I apologise to readers of The Sunday Times for this mistake.

The ebullient defence spokesperson and Minister of Foreign Employment, Keheliya Rambukwella, was waxing eloquent at Monday's news conference at the Media Centre for National Security. Almost at the end of the event in what seemed an afterthought, he waved the Situation Report page in The Sunday Times and declared that the "expert in defence reporting" cannot even identify an aircraft. Once again, I had honorary mention in the defence.lk website too.

At a time when his compatriots in the defence establishment have chosen to call me a "traitor," the title of "expert" from Mr. Rambukwella is worthy indeed. I thank him for that. Yet, I have never claimed to be an expert and will not do so in the future too. I would only say I have been a student who has witnessed the transition from Tamil moderation to militancy since its inception in the 1970s.

A placard carried by a demonstrator who staged a protest near my house, organised by sections of the Government, in August, this year, after I exposed the controversial MiG-27 procurement deal declared I am "only a journalist." Indeed I am. Like all others, I make mistakes. However, I am never hesitant to correct them when I realise there has been one. I have often emphasised this in previous Situation Reports.

This brings us to the question of aircraft/helicopters/UAVs destroyed or damaged during the October 22 attack. Details are now unfolding before a six-member Air Force Court of Inquiry headed by Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra. Other members are Air Commodore B.L.W. Balasuriya, Group Captain Lal Perera, Group Captain W.A. Nanayakkara, Wing Commander Nissanka Jayawardena and Wing Commander Prasanna Ekanayake. Another Air Force Court of Inquiry headed by Group Captain Royce Gunaratna is probing the crash of the Bell 212 helicopter at Doramadalawa in Mihintale.

It is established that the following were destroyed : Two Mil Mi-17 helicopters, one 206 Bell Jetranger, a Beechcraft, one Chinese built K-8 trainer, one Mi-24 helicopter gun-ship, two Chinese built PT-6 trainers and two brand new Blue Horizon II UAVs. The latter is not part of the Air Force assets and belonged to an Israeli supplier. They were to be flight tested on October 26 but the attack had occurred earlier. This is in addition to the Bell-212 helicopter that crashed.

The task before the Court of Inquiry headed by Air Vice Marshal Premachandra, among other matters, is to determine which of the damaged SLAF assets are economically viable to be repaired. The rest would thus become junk. That will include five PT-6 trainers inside the hangar that have been exposed to the heat from anti tank fire or grenade attack.

The extreme heat came from the Mi-17 and the Bell Jetranger 206 that were set ablaze. Some were partly burnt. The perspex canopies have melted.

Another is the Searcher Mk II UAV. Its two wings had been damaged and the engine cowlings made out of fibreglass warped. Four Cessna 150s that belonged to the Air Force have also been damaged. The four SF 260 TP Siai Marchetti bombers are not being considered a financial loss since they were unserviceable and lay parked there. Together with three Mi-17 helicopters that were not damaged, the total number of Air Force assets at the Anuradhapura airbase was thus 30.

Acts of bravery by some of the airmen during the guerrilla attack on the airbase are now unfolding before the SLAF Court of Inquiry. One of the heroes is an Air Force Corporal who stood near the Control Tower and took a number of hits with his sniper rifle. He is said to have killed at least eight intruding guerrillas. Some of them had detonated their 'suicide belts' and died on the runway.

Members of the tri service Court of Inquiry headed by the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, visited the airbase last weekend. They interviewed officers and other ranks besides making an on-the-spot study on how the defences were breached. A more extended inquiry into all aspects is being conducted by the Criminal Investigation Department. That is under the direct charge of D.W. Prathapasinghe, DIG (CID).

Whilst several probes are under way to identify lapses that led to the devastating attack at the Anuradhapura airbase, the task of enhancing security measures in most parts of the country has fallen on the security establishment. As the guerrillas plan to trigger off more attacks, some ahead of their "great heroes" day, maintaining vigilance at the highest level has become the undaunting task for Security Forces and the Police.

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/071111/Columns/sitreport.html

Prabhakaran has no one to blame but himself

Monday, 5 November 2007 - 12:32 PM SL Time

LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is mourning his political wing leader S. P. Tamilselvam, who perished in an air raid on Friday together with five others. There are two schools of thought about that killing.

One is that the Sri Lanka Air Force mounted that decapitation strike using intelligence it had gathered on its own it had identified the target weeks ago but desisted from taking it until time was opportune. And the Tigers struck in Anuradhapura. Others argue that Tamilselvam`s enemies within the LTTE leaked information about his hideout, as he had fallen out with the leadership towards his tragic end.

Prabhakaran, as his history reveals, knows more than one way to skin a Tiger, according to the second school of thought. He, as is well known, doesn`t tolerate dissent and goes to any extent to remove from his path anyone who, he thinks, will be a threat to his leadership one day. The de facto deputy leader of the LTTE Mahattaya or Mahendraraja became too popular within the organisation and it was expected that he would one day succeed Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran got him `arrested`, kept in a dungeon and finally murdered together with over 200 of his loyalists. Prabhakaran is also said to have betrayed Kuttumani because he was perceived as a threat. Kuttumani was arrested on a tip-off from the LTTE itself and later killed in the then UNP government-instigated prison riots in 1983. Prabhakaran`s rivals still have serious doubts about how a vessel with Kittu, another popular LTTE leader, on board came to be intercepted in 1993, causing his death. More recently, immediately before Karuna`s breakaway, Prabhakaran sent for both Paduman and Karuna and the SLMM arranged for their travel to the Wanni. An SLAF chopper picked up Paduman from Trincomalee and proceeded to Batticaloa, where Karuna was to board it. Karuna had second thoughts and refused to join Paduman. That was the last seen of Paduman, who is believed to be either killed or incarcerated in the Wanni as his loyalty to Prabhakaran was in question.

The conspiracy theorists claim that Prabhakaran`s decision to groom his son for leadership has resulted in a bitter power struggle and that led to the information leak in question. The battles fought between Sea Tiger chief Soosai`s faction and Pottu Amman`s loyalists in Scandinavia, they say, demonstrate how serious the LTTE`s crisis is.

This view is, however, disputed by the other school of thought, which insists that the full credit should be given to the SLAF for the successful surgical strike mounted after months of intelligence gathering. Military intelligence, the proponents of this view point out, has successfully broken into the inner cells of the LTTE. Even before Tamilselvam fell out with Prabhakaran, they argue, the army long rangers had almost accounted for him, with the benefit of accurate information about his movements and, therefore, Friday`s attack was something to be expected. They ask why on earth the Prabhakaran faction should have helped the SLAF gain mileage with a devastating airstrike and boost its morale in the aftermath of the Anuradhapura debacle. Friday`s air raid also destroyed sophisticated communication equipment belonging to the LTTE, they say, and therefore it is not possible that the LTTE leadership had a hand in the tip-off. Prabhakaran, they argue, could have clipped Tamilselvam`s wings further and relegated him to obscurity after promoting another person for that job, without enabling the SLAF to overshadow the Anuradhapura attack. This argument, we reckon, is tenable. Else, the Tiger leadership wouldn`t have been so rattled and paranoid in the aftermath of the attack.

`Our people are in profound shock and sorrow,` Prabhakaran has said of Tamilsevlam`s death in a condolence message, describing him as a true leader loved by the people and respected by the international community. De mortuis nil nisi bonum! But, it needs to be added that Tamilselvam was no saint. He was a military man with a political face. That`s why he was promoted to the rank of `Brigadier` posthumously. Remember it was he who threatened to destroy targets in the South following the fall of Thoppigala.

Tamilselvam was only a dwarf in comparison to the Tamil political leaders and intellectuals the LTTE has assassinated such as Amirthalingam, Rajini, Neelan, Yogeswaran, Sarojini, Padmanabha and Kadir. The LTTE also assassinated President Premadasa, Gamini and Lalith and almost accounted for President Kumaratunga. In India, it assassinated Rajiv.

Tamilselvam is the highest ranking LTTE leader to have been killed after the pioneer of the LTTE`s crude air wing and Prabhakaran`s personal friend Shankar, who died in an army long ranger attack about six years ago. His killing made Prabhakaran confine himself to his well fortified bunker all the time and opt for a truce, which was also partly due to the fallout of the 9/11 attacks. He was so frightened that he got the Norwegians to insert a special section into the CFA prohibiting deep penetration operations. The UNF government played into his hands by raiding the safe house of the long rangers at Athurugiriya and divulging their identities. The LTTE decimated the entire intelligence network that the deep penetration unit had painstakingly put in place over so many years. But, the long rangers are said to be back in action in the Wanni.

What Prabhakaran urgently needs at this juncture is a breather. His ammunition stocks are running out with no hope of replenishment due to the effective blockade by the Navy, which has sunk as many as eight arms smuggling vessels for the past thirteen months. Now that the army is poised to march on the Wanni and the military intelligence has outsmarted Pottu Amman`s outfit?some foreign defence analysts with a soft corner for the LTTE have warned that the LTTE leader is vulnerable to airstrikes as never before?Prabhakaran might wave an olive branch as a tactical ploy the way he did in 2001, contrary to the belief that he will go all out to inflict heavy damage on the military in retaliation for Tamilselvam`s death.

His message on the killing is devoid of usual threats. It is more an appeal for the consumption of the international community. `Despite the repeated and continuous calls from the international community to find a peaceful resolution to Tamil national question,` Prabhakran has said, `we have not seen any goodwill from the Sinhala nation.` (Emphasis added). He has given something to the peace lobby to hold on to. It will be interesting to see what he has got to say in his `heroes` day`speech which is due shortly.

Prabhakaran has no way of absolving himself of the responsibility for Tamilselvam`s death. But for his decision to plunge the country back into war last year by capturing the Mavil Aru anicut, Tamilselvam would still have been smiling in Kilinochchi, `loved by the people and respected by the international community` as he says.

Having suffered a string of humiliating defeats, Prabhakaran had just scored a win, when disaster struck. Worse, he has run short of surprises for the Sri Lankan state. He has attacked almost every economic or military target from the Central Bank to the Katunayaka airbase killed a President, a service commander and a large number of political and military leaders partly destroyed the main oil installation committed a large number of massacres and blown up civilian targets. But, he has not got anywhere near his goal. Instead, he has to live in eternal fear, encircled in the Wanni with the army threatening to move in any moment. His arms smuggling network is in tatters and intelligence wing has been wrong-footed.

A prisoner of his own violence, Prabhakaran has had to begin from the very beginning after two decades of fighting. He has no one to blame but himself.

Who ‘ratted’ on Thamilselvan?

* Is there an enemy within the LTTE?
* Is there opposition to Charles Anthony succeeding Prabhakaran?

How did Sri Lankan Intelligence pinpoint the LTTE’s second in command S.P. Thamilselvan’s exact location?

Who leaked this highly sensitive information the to Sri Lanka Directorate of Military Intelligence?

Have they infiltrated the LTTE? Are there any double agents within the organisation?

After the demise of Thamilselvan, are there enemies within the LTTE?
With the above questions in the Tiger supremo Prabhakaran’s mind, he strongly expressed his displeasure to LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman and ordered the LTTE’s deputy head of intelligence Kapil Amman alias ‘Charles’, to investigate how this sensitive information was passed to military intelligence. He also ordered Pottu Amman to avenge the killing of Thamilselvan. Pottu Amman has not been seen in public for many years. Nevertheless, surprisingly, he attended Thamilselvan’s funeral and made a speech. He never did this before as an intelligence chief, as intelligence operatives or heads of intelligence are generally ‘faceless’. His sudden public appearance raises questions? Is he guilty?


Intelligence assessment is as follows


1. Planned suicide missions failed on three occasions recently. The occasions were when the security forces detected 986 kg C4 explosives-laden truck in Kurunegala district, more than 100 kg explosives-laden truck in Trincomalee, and 60 C4 explosive-laden van detected in Colombo. If these consignments of explosives were detonated in Colombo, there would have been massive damage to life and property.


2. Rocket propelled grenade attack on VIP vehicles


3. Sniper fire on VIPS from high rise buildings.


There is fire under the carpet within the LTTE after Thamilselvan’s demise.


His death was a great loss to LTTE leader Prabhakaran. There is an untold story as well as, which we unfold to our readers.


The reason Tiger intelligence chief T Shivashankar was baptised Pottu because he killed people by firing point blank to the middle of the head.


Pottu Amman is eyeing the LTTE Leadership and he tells tales to Prabhakaran, whenever someone gets close to VP. Finally, he wants to sideline those who get close to the Tiger chief. Examples are when Goplaswami alias ‘Mahatthya’ was close to Prabhakaran, Pottu killed him. Yogi, and Vinyamurthi Muralidaran alias ‘Karuna’ were also separated by Pottu, after telling tales to Prabhakaran.


Sea Tiger leader Soosai was also sidelined by the leadership, due to the same reason. After Soosai’s son died in the Mullathivu lagoon, with Soosai seriously injured in the same incident, Prabhakaran didn’t sympathise. It has been revealed that the crash of the explosive laden boat was not an accident. It was another plot of Pottu Amman’s. Due to this the Sea Tigers are demoralised and there hasn’t been any major naval operations.


If the Sea Tiger wing is paralyzed then their entire logistical arm will be paralyzed.


When it came to Thamilselvan, Pottu Amman tried his utmost to separate Prabhakaran and Thamilselvan but they too close. Thamilselvan as political head, has travelled to 17 countries (European) and was an effective conduit to the Tamil diaspora and a key person who met with foreign delegates and foreign media.


He played an important role within the LTTE as military consultant, political head and in its propaganda. Thamilselvan had direct access to Prabhakaran, and at any given time, they met in person or were in touch over the phone.


Pottu Amman spread the story among LTTE cadres and civilians that Prabhakaran was not in good terms with Thamilselvan and that he had been sidelined from the leadership but, Pottu Amman’s psy-op had failed.
According to sources, Thamilselvan and Pottu Amman did not see eye to eye. At times Pottu Amman tried to dictate to Thamilselvan, which he ignored.


Thamilselvan’s close associates were the LTTE’s Peace Secretariat Head S. Pulidaven and Deputy Political Head S. Thangiah alias ‘Suda Master’ and Sea Tiger leader Soosai, all of whom were not on good terms with Pottu Amman.


The question is why didn’t Prabhakaran appoint Pulidaven or Suda Master as political head? Did he not trust them?


Prabhakaran appointed Nadesan as political head, a one time police constable attached to Kirulapone police station. This appointment surprised the LTTE leaders and cadres, as well as Pulidaven, who is now frustrated by this.


Security of all leaders of LTTE was beefed up and Prabakaran too has started taking additional precautions.


Well informed sources said that he lives in a bunker 30 feet underground (Adela Balasinham’s book Will To Freedom, has clearly mentions this bunker. He was in the bunker, when the IPKF launched an offensive in Mullathivu). He lives comfortably in the bunker and comes out only at night. When he went to pay his respects to Thamilselvan in the night, six vehicles escorted him. He garlanded the bodies and quickly returned to his bunker. He has several bunkers and doesn’t live in one particular bunker for more than a day. The area around the bunkers are heavily mined.


Imran Pandian Brigade guards Prabhakaran, his wife and son Charles Anthony. Only select cadres from Jaffna are recruited and well trained. Most of them are relatives of Prabhakaran and his wife.
Recently released photographs show that Prabakaran has put on weight. He also wears spectacles and is Diabetic.


Suppiya Thamilselvan was a close confidant as well as Prabhakaran’s bodyguard. He was Jaffna and Pooneryn commander. He was injured in battle. and used a walking stick. After his disability, Prabhakaran appointed him as his personal assistant. Soon after, he was appointed political wing head. Although Thamilselvan was the Political head, he also functioned as a military consultant to Prabhakaran.


Prabhakaran lost North and East as mentioned last week in this column. Prabhakaran wanted to hoist the Eelam flag in Jaffna city. Therefore, he sent Thamilselvan to Pooneryn as well as Muhamalai, to plan the offensive.


In August 2006, LTTE tried to infiltrate from Kilali and Muhamalai but were thwarted by the security forces. Between October 28 and 31 this year, Thamilselvan was at Pooneryn and inspected defense lines and artillery gun positions. He returned to Kilinochchi on November 1 in a jeep, with one vehicle each in front and behind, escorting him.


Before he arrived, regional cadres were deployed on his route, to ensure there weren’t any army long range reconnaissance patrol teams.
To prevent any intruders into the LTTE area this year, special identity cards were introduced for civilians.


On the early morning of November 2, Thamilselvan arrived with Lt. Col. Anupumani alias ‘Alex’ chief of LTTE’s “strategic communication division”. He was in charge of all communications between Prabhakaran and the other international terrorist agents, and also with his bodyguards
Two fighter jets, a MiG and a Kfir from Katunayake, flown by two experienced pilots, bombed the hideout with pinpoint accuracy, from an altitude of 1,500 feet. Thamilselavan’s bodyguards, who shielded him, were blown to pieces, while his body was intact.


The bodyguards’ coffins were sealed. However, Thamilselvan’s wife Sasiroaja was fortunate to see here husband’s body, because of his bodyguards


When the pilots reported “mission accomplished” to their Commanding Officer, he informed Air Force Chief Air Marshal Roshan Gunathilake around 11.30. Intelligence confirmed that Thamilselvan was dead and re-confirmed at 12.15 pm.


The Air Force Commander boarded a Bell 212 helicopter to Katunayake, where he met the pilots and congratulated them. Air Marshal Gunathilake said to this column last week that although Anuradhapura air base was attacked, our pilots’ morale is high and they proved it.


Anybody could question that, if military intelligence was accurate, why the Anuradhapura air base attack could not be foretold? A senior Military Officer said that any country’s intelligence has pluses and minuses. Even the CIA, with all its resources and manpower, couldn’t prevent the 9/11 attack.

The CIA and their military intelligence are still hunting for Osama bin Laden. British intelligence MI 6 couldn’t prevent subway explosions.
110 Sri Lankan peacekeeping soldiers were sent home, guilty of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Military spokesman said that a court of inquiry visited Haiti, while an inquiry by an INGO identified only six soldiers, producing only three witnesses.


On the completion of the inquiry, if the soldiers are found guilty they will punished according military law.


Rohan Gunaratna reflecting on the death of Thamilselvan Said that he was a cunning and a ruthless leader responsible for several attacks on military camps as well as massacres of Sinhala and Muslim border villagers and bombings that killed women and children. In his capacity as a district military commander of the LTTE, he proved that he was competent in battle and politics. Although, at the time of his death, he held the title of political leader, Thamilselvan was committed to achieving a Tamil State not through political negotiation and compromise but, through violence and intimidation.

Contrary to the image he portrayed, Thamilselvan was like Prabhakaran - using political gains to consolidate the fighting structures of the LTTE. He was instrumental in negotiating with Norway and other Western countries to build the LTTE’s capabilities, in the guise of talking and projecting peace.

Thamilselvan functioned as the deputy to Prabhakaran, after Prabhakaran ordered the execution of his deputy Ajith Mahendrarajah. Thamilselvan was disliked by other LTTE leaders, for his closeness to Prabhakaran.


The targeted assassination of the Thamilselvan was successful because of it was an intelligence led operation. Sound and timely intelligence is key to good operational counter terrorism. An example of painstaking intelligence collection, Thamilselvan’s death is a reminder that intelligence is the spearhead of counter terrorism. In the fight against terrorism, both intelligence and building elite forces (commandos, special forces, airborne forces) is key. Instead of building a numerically large military to fight the LTTE ground forces, the strategy should be to focus on intelligence led operations, to target high value targets like leaders and high value assets like LTTE aviation. It is a reverse of what the LTTE is doing. Until now, the government’s flawed strategy has been to capture real estate, weakening its ability to maintain the offensive capability.

Terrorism should be fought with brains not with muscle.


Combating terrorism could be divided into anti terrorism, operational counter terrorism, and strategic counter terrorism. Anti terrorism or protection of government targets, both infrastructure and personnel, is central. Prabhakaran, an avengeful leader, is likely to retaliate by killing a Sri Lankan political leader. Government and society must be robust and resilient to suffer losses.

This could include even the loss of Tamil leaders that have joined mainstream politics such as Sithathan, Devananda, and Karuna, who the government has a responsibility to protect. They are more important for the future stability of the Sri Lankan State, than ministers serving in the Rajapaksa government.


http://www.thebottomline.lk/2007/11/07/B33.htm

JR’s Kandy March and the tale of ‘Imbulgoda Veeraya’

Last month saw the golden jubilee of a shameful event in the political annals of this country. October 3, 1957 was the day on which the United National Party (UNP) organised a protest march to Kandy from Colombo under the leadership of Junius Richard Jayewardene. JR’s ‘Kandy March,’ as it was known, played a very negative role in souring ethnic relations in the island.
The agreement, signed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayagam in 1957, was a significant event in the political history of post-independence Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister of the day and the leader of the biggest Tamil political party had come to an understanding, which if implemented may have helped contain the ethnic conflict at its nascent stages.

The agreement, known generally as the ‘Banda-Chelva pact,’ was never allowed to work because of political opposition in the south. The opposition came from hardliners among the Sinhala Buddhist clergy and laity as well as hawkish elements among both the government and opposition.

Communalist politics
The UNP was vehemently opposed to the B-C, pact calling it a sell-out of the Sinhalese. The UNP had only eight seats in Parliament, being buried in the landslide victory of S.W.R.D. in 1956. With Sir John Kotelawela becoming a mere figurehead and Dudley Senanayake inactive, it was J.R. Jayewardene’s task to revive the UNP’s flagging fortunes.

Just as S.W.R.D. rode to power by playing the communal card, JR too resorted to communalist politics to discredit the new regime. Jayewardene seized on the B-C pact as a vulnerable target and began whipping up communal frenzy against it. The UNP began toying with the idea of organising a massive road march in protest against the betrayal of the country through the B-C pact.
The UNP first thought of trekking on foot from Colombo to Anuradhapura and swearing before the sacred Bo tree that they would safeguard the country by opposing the B-C pact. That plan was shelved because the 119-mile journey was too long and also because the greater part of the route was through sparsely populated areas and jungles.

It was decided then to march to Kandy and take the oath at the Dalada Maligawa. The UNP wanted to make a grand spectacle of it and the densely populated areas along the Colombo-Kandy Road as well as the shorter distance of 72 miles was ideal. A public meeting was scheduled at the ‘Pattiruppuwa’ at the end of the march.
A recurring political phenomenon in this country has been the conduct of politicians using the Buddhist clergy as a cover to pursue divisive racist politics. These politicians manipulate sections of the Buddhist clergy and use them as a front for their selfish political projects.

Six-day march
So in 1957 the Mahanayakes of Asgiriya and Malwatte Chapters were persuaded to extend an open letter of invitation requesting people to assemble in Kandy on October 8 and take a vow before the Sacred Tooth Relic that they would prevent division of the country through the agreement between Bandaranaike and Chelvanayagam.

October 8 was a full-moon Poya Day. JR’s plan was to start a six day march on October 3 and reach Kandy well in time for the mass rally on October 8. The marchers, describing themselves as pilgrims, wanted to cover 12 miles each day.

The government was perturbed by the political mileage the UNP could derive through a successful march. The national press criticised the plan as one that could cause communal unrest and violence. Various pressures were exerted on JR to call it off but he stood firmly by his decision.

One man who anticipated government-instigated violence was former Premier Sir John Kotelawela. He warned the party that S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike would not allow the march. Being a pugnacious personality, Sir John advised party members to arm themselves to resist and counter violence. This, of course, was not followed.

Thousands of UNP stalwarts and supporters including J.R. Jayewardene, M.D. Banda, Anandatissa de Alwis and Ranasinghe Premadasa began the march from Colombo on October 3. Violence was unleashed in the form of stones being thrown and marchers being beaten.

Cabinet Ministers like Philip Gunawardena, William Silva, Stanley de Zoysa and C.P. de Silva were suspected of organising gangs to attack the marchers. Colombo Central MP M.S. Themis also sent his thugs.

Under attack
The stoning was intense in areas like Grand Pass and Peliyagoda. The police did nothing as they had been instructed not to intervene. Mobs of government supporters gathered along the route and began hooting and jeering.
Several traffic jams were caused by the march. Many turned back due to the violence. The marchers walked 12 miles and reached Kadawatha to rest for the night. Once again, government-backed mobs began to stone the houses in which UNP marchers were staying in Kadawatha. Again the police did nothing.

JR’s younger brother and eminent lawyer, H.W. Jayewardene queried from Deputy Inspector General of Police C.C. “Jungle” Dissanayake whether the police would not stop the attacks, to which the DIG replied that his orders were not to interfere.
H.W. then threatened “Jungle” with a lawsuit for dereliction of duty in the face of a threat to peace. Thereafter, the DIG exceeded his orders and extended protection to all the houses.

JR hoped to end the second leg of the trek at a Buddhist Vihare in the Attanagalle electorate. Attanagalle then was the pocket borough of the Bandaranaikes. Allowing JR to march in and tarry for the night was seen as a political challenge and personal affront. Gampaha MP and kinsman of S.W.R.D., S.D. Bandaranaike was assigned the task of stopping the march.

The UNP recommenced its march early morning on October 4. Most of JR’s demoralised followers had deserted him overnight. Instead of the thousands of people marching on the first day, there were only about 125 people ready to follow the leader. The streets of Kadawatha too were generally deserted and there were no jeering mobs.

Horizontal obstacle
Three miles of marching saw the UNP reach Imbulgoda at about 7:20 a.m. At one point the marchers saw two vehicles parked in the middle of the road. A man was lying on the road between both vehicles. About 150 people were sitting on the road behind the vehicles.

More than 500 persons were standing on either side of the road with stones to be thrown at the marchers. The horizontal obstacle was none other than Gampaha MP, S.D. Bandaranayake.

Having heard of the Kandy March and how it was stopped at Imbulgoda, I was very curious to see the exact spot it happened. Though I travelled frequently along that road, I could never locate it.

Finally in the ’80s, my friend Yapa Karunaratne from Divaina took me to the exact spot. I found the road to be on an embankment and around a short bend. S.D. Bandaranaike had chosen the ideal place to launch his attack. The mobs would have had a field day pelting stones down.

Former Police Assistant Superintendent D.S. Thambaiyah was in charge of security in that area. Even as the stone throwing began, he intervened and asked JR and the marchers to stop a while. He then began talking to S.D. Bandaranayake, urging him to remove his supporters.

SD replied by saying that he had not brought anyone to stop the march and that he was only protesting non-violently to prevent the march as it was likely to disturb peace and trigger off violence if allowed to proceed unchecked.
The ASP then informed his superiors of the stand-off and placed a police party in between both groups as a buffer. He also warned the bystanders not to pelt stones. The mobs then ended stoning but threw paper balls, trash, and sand at the dwindling number of marchers.

Breach of peace
Soon DIGs “Jungle” Dissanayake and Sidney de Zoysa arrived with a posse of armed policemen. After palavering with both parties, the senior DIGs asked JR to call off the march as a major breach of peace was anticipated.
JR was aware that his followers were deserting him and agreed to call it off. But he told the DIGs that he intended walking alone as a pilgrim to Kandy. A solitary pilgrim could not disrupt peace, JR pointed out.
Dissanayake and de Zoysa then asked for time to consult higher authorities about JR’s request. S.D. Bandaranayake was informed that the march was officially banned. SD then made a rousing speech to his supporters and got them to disperse by 10:30 a.m.

JR meanwhile squatted by the side of the road and told his supporters that he would continue his march and in an exhibition of ‘Gallery Sellama,’ said that he had written his will before starting out. JR requested his supporters to go back. However, predictably, the UNP supporters would not accept JR’s stance and urged that all of them retreat with honour.
Subsequently JR was told that the march was totally banned and no individual would be allowed to proceed on foot. So JR called off the march officially.

Four buses of the Ceylon Omnibus Company were called and the remaining 70-75 UNP members including JR got in and started out for Colombo at about 12:30 p.m. Police escort was provided. Thus ended the infamous Kandy March of JR.
Thereafter S.D. Bandaranayake was described on political platforms as the ‘Imbulgoda Veeraya’ or ‘Hero of Imbulgoda.’ SD himself called it a people’s victory and said that he had initially blocked the march with only 12 people and that gradually hundreds of people had flocked in support voluntarily.
The scheduled rally in Kandy was held as planned on October 8. Both JR and Dudley spoke but the attendance was not large.
Watershed

Though the Kandy March was aborted, the event was a watershed in the sense that it focussed negative attention on the B-C pact effectively.
JR’s Kandy March was the forerunner that helped foment adverse public opinion against the B-C pact. Ultimately Bandaranaike abrogated the pact unilaterally and tore up a copy of it in front of demonstrators.

When I was working for Virakesari, I used to cover the then State Ministry. Anandatissa de Alwis was State Minister then. Being an ex-journalist, de Alwis used to get along well with scribes, unlike those in charge of media nowadays.
Once I read somewhere that Anandatissa too had participated in the Kandy March. When I asked him about it he seemed very embarrassed.

He said that the move seemed very reasonable to him at that time but with the passage of time he had come to regret it. He said that many in the UNP felt remorse about it now. I then asked him whether the President (JR) too felt that way, to which the diplomatic Anandatissa replied he did not know.

But I do recall that JR was asked a question about the Kandy March at a rally in the Jaffna esplanade when he visited as Opposition Leader in 1975. JR was bold and honest enough to say that he would lead a similar march to Kandy again if similar circumstances warranted it. Jaffna SLFP Mayor Alfred Duraiyappa’s supporters then used it as a pretext to disrupt the meeting.
This then is the story of JR’s Kandy March and how S.D. Bandaranayake helped stop it and became known as the ‘Imbulgoda Veeraya.’ The ultimate casualties were the B-C pact in particular and ethnic harmony in general.

(An Article on the nation)http://www.nation.lk/2007/11/04/newsfe1.htm
(D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@federalidea.com)

SLAF regains its image with powerful strike

* Killing of Tamilselvan and five others devastating blow to Tigers
* More disclosures on the Anuradhapura airbase attack

By Iqbal Athas

Near crack of dawn Friday, a Kfir and a MiG-27, both ground attack aircraft, took to the skies from the Sri Lanka Air Force base at Katunayake. For nearly 15 minutes, they maintained an altitude of some 15,000 feet. As their target neared, they dropped altitude. At some 1,000 feet, they dived and dropped their lethal cargo of bombs. It was on a building near the 150th milepost along the A-9 highway at Kilinochchi. The aircraft returned to base safely thereafter.

Six hours later news spread that Suppiah Palani Tamilslevan, head of the Political Wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), had been killed. Some Government leaders and even those in the defence establishment were receiving calls from London. Several minutes later, Seeran, Secretary of the LTTE said in a press release:

Guerrillas who took part in the Anuradhapura attack being “decorated” by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

"With deep sorrow we announce to the people of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil people living all over the world and the international community that at 6 p.m. today, Friday 2nd November 2007, Head of our organisation's Political Division, Brig. S.P. Tamilselvan was killed by the Sri Lankan Air Force aerial bombing. With him Lt. Col. Anpumani (Alex), Major Mihutan, Capt. Nethagy, Lt. Adchgivel and Lt. Vahaikumaran were also killed."

It was world news. Locally, when the radio stations interrupted their programmes to break the news, there was euphoria in several areas. In Kurunegala, people lit crackers. At a garage in Potuhera, mechanics stopped work, gathered together to clap and dance. "Maru vedey (good work)" exhorted the owner. Others clapped and cheered. International satellite TV networks and radio stations broke the news. The Tamil diaspora in Canada were ringing the LTTE satellite telephones in Kilinochchi. They were calling for revenge.

Soon after the incident, Tiger guerrillas had sealed off the entire area where bombs fell. They conducted a thorough search. Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were informally told of the bombing incident and the death of Tamilselvan. It is thereafter that they went public.

The Air Force has struck a devastating blow to the LTTE. That was just 12 days after the LTTE attack on the airbase at Anuradhapura where heavy damage was inflicted. Tamilselvan was no ordinary person. He was the face of the LTTE. As head of its peace team, he led delegations for peace talks with the Government in Bangkok, Oslo and Geneva. He spoke for the LTTE with diplomats and media personnel visiting Kilinochchi. Even if he was at loggerheads with the military wing, particularly with the leadership of their intelligence unit, Tamilselvan enjoyed the confidence of his leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Thus, he was the voice of Mr. Prabhakaran to the outside world.

Forty-year-old Tamilselvan was born on August 29, 1967 in Chavakachcheri. He is the father of a daughter and son. This is how Adele Balasingham (widow of LTTE ideologue the late Anton Balasingham) describes Tamilselvan in her book The Will to Freedom:

"Mr. Tamil Chelvan was one of the youngest cadres to join the struggle in those early days in 1984. It was his passion for the struggle, coupled with his dedication which caught the eye of Mr. Prabhakaran. Following his military training, Mr. Prabhakaran inducted Tamil Chelvan into his inner circle by recruiting him as one of the most trusted bodyguards. In terms of struggle, Tamil Chelvan is a contemporary of Sornam having functioned as a bodyguard to Mr. Prabhakaran. (Note: Sornalingam alias Sornam, a former bodyguard of the LTTE leader and later head of their Air Wing was killed during an Army Long Range Reconnaisance Patrol attack)

"He was promoted to the post of commander of Tenmarachchi, where he was faced with the challenge of leading the resistance against the occupying Indian Army. He succeeded in this task and was rewarded with the post of Commander of Jaffna where he engaged in many battles in the defence of the peninsula. Tamil Chelvan also wears his battle scars from the several occasions he has been wounded. The most dangerous injury that threatened his life occurred when shrapnel from exploding aerial bombs shattered his leg.
S.P. Tamilslevan

"With his limb hanging from his body and bleeding profusely, Tamil Chelvan was on the brink of death when he arrived at the Jaffna hospital for resuscitation treatment. Miraculously he survived his injuries and, after a long period of recuperation and learning to walk with the support of a walking stick, he resumed his duties. Tamil Chelvam was promoted as head of the political section following the Mahattaya scandal and Kittu's unfortunate death at the hands of the Indian Navy. He remains at the post.

"As a trusted confidant of Mr. Prabhakaran, Tamil Chelvan's work has steadily expanded to include, apart from his many responsibilities as the leader of the political wing of the LTTE, the task of arranging LTTE's functions, including the weddings. Assisting him was Sudha, the head of Tamil Chelvan's administrative structure, a tireless and creative worker. Tamil Chelvan delegated to Sudha the responsibility of attending to our care and maintenance while we were in Jaffna and in Vanni.

"With Mr. Tamil Chelvan's interest and Sudha's skills our life in both Jaffna and the Vanni was made that much easier. Tamil Chelvan was generous to us and made every effort to ensure that we were relatively comfortable. He regularly sent me fruit and vegetables that he ordered specially from the Vavuniya town.

"In recognition of Bala's lengthy history with the organisation, his experience and wide knowledge, Tamil Chelvan always consulted Bala and valued his advice on wide ranging issues. Bala supported Tamil Chelvan with his intellectual input into the political work. He was often a visitor to our house to discuss political issues and quite often for a meal. His favourite dish was my white fish curry (sothi), from which he enjoyed eating the cooked head of the fish."

Tamilselvan's close confidant Alex ("Lt. Col. Anpumani") was also killed. He accompanied the political wing leader on his travel abroad for both peace talks and fund-raising activities. Alex was also a cameraman and often carried a laptop computer that was used by his leader. The building that was bombed is one that had been used as a living quarters by leading members of the LTTE. Mr. Tamilselvan who was used to the habit of shifting locations regularly had chosen to spend Thursday night there. Other details relating to his death appear elsewhere in The Sunday Times.

The air strike that killed the LTTE political wing leader and five others has helped the Air Force regain its public image. This is particularly after the October 22 guerrilla attack on the SLAF airbase in Anuradhapura. Besides three different investigations that are under way, a fourth has now been tasked to go into how the incident occurred.

That is by a tri-services board. It is headed by the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda (Chairman), and comprises Major General Lawrence Fernando, Chief of Staff of the Army, Air Vice Marshal Ravi Arunthavanathan, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air force, Jayanath Colombage, Chief of Staff of the Navy and Mohanti Peiris, Director (Legal) of the Army. They are expected to travel to Anuradhapura airbase.

Already two different Courts of Inquiry - one to probe the incident and the other the crash of the Bell 212 helicopter - have been appointed by the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Roshan Gunathilake. In addition, a team from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) is also conducting a detailed probe.

More details of issues relating to the guerrilla attack on the airbase are now surfacing. In one instance, it has come to light that troops manning check-points in Anuradhapura had sold tickets to the Motor Cross rally. It was held just the day prior to the attack. Among those who had purchased the tickets were civilians living in uncontrolled areas of the Wanni. One of them had disclosed he paid Rs 50 for a ticket. Though this move did not contribute to the attack, purchasing those tickets would have helped those living in the Wanni to gain access to a military-sponsored event.

Air Force sources say that within hours of the attack on the airbase, ground attack aircraft bombed the LTTE airbase in Iranamadu. It is located south-east of Kilinochchi adjacent to the Iranamadu tank. These sources said during a sortie where the aircraft flew low, the guerrillas had fired what is suspected to be Surface-to-Air Missiles. However, counter missile systems were activated. The pilots boldly dived to bomb a location where the two guerrilla aircraft involved in the airbase attack had landed. The lights at the airbase had been on for quite sometime.
A damaged Chinese built K-8 intermediate trainer aircraft inside the SLAF hangar at Anuradhapura. Note the glass canopy is warped due to the heat from fire. The nose and the wings are damaged. This is just one of five K-8 aircraft that were inside the hangar.

There were claims by some officials that the Situation Report last week had falsely reported that eight Chinese built K-8 aircraft of the SLAF were destroyed during the airbase attack. One of them claimed that the SLAF possessed only one and that our report was wrong. The Sunday Times stands by its statement that one K-8 was destroyed outside the hangar and that five others were damaged inside the hangar. A picture on this page shows one of the five damaged K-8 aircraft inside the hangar.

I referred last week to a cunning ploy by the LTTE in cropping a photograph they released to maintain only 21 of their cadres were engaged in the attack on the airbase. I disclosed that the CID investigators have reason to believe that 27 guerrilla cadres were involved in the attack. There was another LTTE action that confirmed beyond doubt that the numbers that came were more than their claimed 21.

The Tamilnet website on Thursday said that LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran conferred "Awards of Valour for Tiger cadres who excelled in their performance in the Anuradhapura operation against the Sri Lankan airbase." It said there were four different decorations - "one for individual performance, one for group performance in warfare, one for individual extraordinary performance in a particular field in warfare and for five consecutive and successful flight operations."
Related Links
Air defence zones in Lanka sky

The pictures accompanying the story had Mr. Prabhakaran pinning the medals on two "Air Tigers." Their faces were covered. Were only two photographs published to avoid the exact number involved in the attack becoming public? It is therefore clear from the Tamilnet account that some of the cadres returned to the Wanni.

See pictures on this page. Security in the City of Colombo and suburbs has been intensified following Friday's air raid that killed Mr. Tamilselvan. Troops are on high alert. The guerrillas would want to retaliate for the devastating loss they have suffered. That is no secret. Thus, the need for greater vigilance is a sine qua non.

Pre-dawn pounce

• Upto 27 Black Tiger suicide cadres were able to go unchecked right to the aircraft hangar
• Special Forces join Air Force to prevent the base being over-run
• All but three of the 27 aircraft in the base destroyed or damaged
By Iqbal Athas


The burnt out remains of a Chinese built K-8 intermediate trainer aircraft on the tarmac of the Sri Lanka Air Force base at Anuradhapura afterMonday’s pre-dawn Tiger guerrilla attack.
The group of Tiger guerrillas, among them three women, wore crumpled camouflage uniforms. These, together with their short haircut, made them look like army soldiers. However, unlike the soldiers, there was still a difference. All of them wore black explosive laden "suicide" belts around their waist.
They held an assortment of weapons - Chinese built T-56 assault rifles, Russian made AK-47 Kalashnikovs, Czech automatic pistols, Light Anti-tank Weapons (LAW), Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) with launchers, Light Machine Guns (LMGs) Mark 82 Chinese made hand grenades, new Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) among them. They had walkie-talkies to talk to each other and satellite telephones to speak with their controllers in the Wanni. They carried mobile phones, maps, medical kits, chocolates and even a flag of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The group lay in wait in an abandoned house in a plot of land, owned by a military officer. It is located alongside the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) base at Anuradhapura - a major platform for military operations against Tiger guerrillas in the North. The base lies south of the historic capital. It is centrally located to rush aircraft for casualty evacuation in the Northern theatre of conflict. It is also headquarters for the Maritime Surveillance Command, the nerve centre for monitoring the deep seas off Sri Lanka.
It was past 3 a.m. on Monday morning. The guerrillas crawled towards the chain-link perimeter fence. They cut a large hole and crept in one by one. The runway lies in a north-easterly and south-westerly direction. Extension work on it is still under way. They reached another obstacle - a fence made of razor sharp concertina wire. They cut through and set foot on the inner perimeters of the Air Force base.
They walked nearly three hundred metres, across the runway, to the hangar. It was open terrain and there was no resistance of any sort. An assortment of both serviceable and unserviceable aircraft lay parked. Some directed fire at the aircraft using Rocket Propelled Grenades and Light Anti-tank Weapons. The pre-dawn calm was shattered. It alerted airmen in their barracks and those on duty at static points. It woke up the neighbourhood. Soon Air Force personnel with their weapons on the ready were moving in to take on the intruders. They came under fire from guerrillas who had taken up position. Yet the airmen continued.


Belted ammunition and hand grenades, part of the guerrilla arsenal.
Some of the Air Force men boldly moved in braving the threats they faced. They were hit and fell dead. Others were wounded. Heavy explosions and the crackle of gunfire continued to render the air. Telephone lines between Anuradhapura and Colombo were busy and news spread that the airbase was under LTTE attack. Even as the fighting continued, the incident was making world news. Almost all reports spoke of the guerrillas, for the first time, simultaneously launching a land and air attack. Some reports said it came at a time when the Government had repeatedly boasted the Tigers were weakened militarily.
The Operations Room at the Air Force Headquarters in Colombo became a hive of activity. Senior officers there were eager to ensure at least some of the aircraft at Anuradhapura were scoured into the skies. The reasons were two fold: one was to use combat aircraft to engage the attackers. The other was to save the non-combat aircraft on the ground. Fire from RPGs and other weapons was too intense. Hence, they lost no time in getting in touch with SLAF base in Vavuniya to arrange for immediate help.
A Bell 212 helicopter was airborne barely half an hour later and was flying towards Anuradhapura. Flight Lieutenant (posthumously promoted Squadron Leader) Amila Mohotti with colleague Flying Officer (posthumously promoted Flight Lieutenant) Dhammika de Silva (co-pilot) piloted it. There were two door gunners at gun positions on either side of the helicopter. They were in the skies over Doramadalawa in Mihintale when the helicopter was hit by gunfire. However, it was not from the Tiger guerrillas. The helicopter crashed to the ground.
The badly shattered wreckage was strewn in an area covered with bushy growth. That was how four brave men of the Air Force sacrificed their lives in defending the nation. If they did not meet with their untimely death, the course of events during the fighting at the airbase would have been different. Fate had decreed otherwise. The four heroes who hurriedly responded to the call of duty were accorded funerals with full military honours.
At the airbase, aircraft were in flames or smouldering. This is both, those parked inside the hangar as well as some parked outside, near the runway. It became apparent that the attack group was in regular contact with their controllers in the Wanni. The guerrillas had told the latter of the progress of their attack. It is only thereafter; some 45 minutes after their infiltration, that two Czech built Zlin Z-143 aircraft of the LTTE flew in to drop two to three bombs. They, however, did not cause any damage within the airbase, according to officers there. According to one source, a bomb fell on an Army Signals unit located in a detachment stationed next to the airbase.
Security officials, including Police at Vavuniya, had seen the two guerrilla aircraft when they were heading in a southerly direction and later returning to Wanni. They had brought it to the attention of Air Force authorities. By this time, however, they were compelled to cope with other urgent tasks, particularly the crash of the Bell 212 helicopter with the two officers and men on board. There was confusion at that hour as to how it occurred. Questions loomed large then whether it was an enemy attack. If so, there were also questions on whether it was safe to have other aircraft take to the skies.
Thus, the role of the guerrilla aircraft was largely a cosmetic feature in the guerrilla assault. The move to have these two aircraft airborne from a secret location in the Wanni, it is now clear, was made only after the guerrillas made sure they would not come under fire. This is in the light of the mayhem they had caused at the airbase. Thus, claims of a combined land and air assault on the airbase became only a technical definition with the air component causing relatively minimal damage.


An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) destroyed inside the SLAF hangar at Anuradhapura. INSET: Part of the military hardware the guerrillas brought for the attack.
It was close to crack of dawn. Troops of the Army's highly trained Special Forces joined the Air Force personnel who were engaging the guerrillas. Some of the guerrillas who were finding themselves cornered detonated their suicide belts and died. Others were shot dead by the Special Forces and the Air Force gunmen. The latter's valiant efforts stalled a total take over of the airbase and a possible hoisting of the LTTE flag by the guerrillas. It was well past 9 a.m. when one or two of the remaining guerrillas were gunned down. One of them had climbed a Kohomba tree, later to the roof of a hangar and begun firing at troop positions. At one point during the fighting, an armoured vehicle was brought in to fire at a guerrilla position. But, the latter had fired at the tyre thus halting its movement. He was later shot dead.
LTTE Military Spokesman, Irasiah Ilanthiriyan told BBC television during a Q & A that their "military command" was in touch with their guerrillas attacking the airbase until 9 a.m. However, this claim could not be verified independently. He said it was this communication link that made the LTTE become aware their assault had led to eight Air Force aircraft being destroyed. Then a cunning LTTE ploy unfolded.
Shortly after the fighting at the airbase at Anuradhapura had ended, the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) held a news conference on Monday morning. There, Defence Spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella declared that 20 guerrilla bodies were found strewn at the airbase. Barely two hours later, the LTTE declared in a news release:
"At 3.20 a.m. a special LTTE Black Tiger team of 21 men and women attacked the Sri Lankan Air Force Base in Anuradhapuram and destroyed and burnt down eight planes and helicopters, including reconnaissance planes and training planes. Following this attack, at 4.30 am LTTE Air Force bombed the same Sri Lankan Air Force Base. "Following is the list of aircraft types belonging to the Air Force that were totally destroyed by the LTTE: one training plane, two Mi-24 Helicopters, one Mi-17, one PT-6, one Bell 212, one Reconnaissance plane, one CTG-748.
"In addition a helicopter that came to the assistance of the Sri Lankan Air Force from Vavuniya also crashed and was destroyed."
After Mr. Rambukwella had spoken of the presence of 20 guerrilla bodies at the airbase, the LTTE news release had claimed that a "Black Tiger team of 21 men and women" attacked the airbase. That is just one more cadre besides the number known dead. One of the news pictures released by LTTE showing the attack team seated with their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, has been cleverly cropped from one end leaving out some cadres, at least one or two, out. Is this a move to facilitate the safe return of the others?
A Criminal Investigation Department (CID) team tasked to investigate the attack, The Sunday Times learnt, has reason to believe the number of guerrillas involved in the attack was 27. Besides, some villagers living near the airbase have said that at around 5 a.m. they had seen two groups leaving the area at different intervals. Each group had comprised three persons. If that is correct, the presence of only one guerrilla is not explained.
Air Force spokesperson Group Captain Ajantha Silva told Monday's news conference at the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) that two Mi-24 helicopters and one K-8 jet trainer were "badly damaged" in the Tiger fire targeting the hangar of the airbase. It took one more day for further confirmation to arrive that the MCNS was playing down the details. Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake told Parliament on Wednesday that among the seven aircraft "destroyed" were one Mi-24 helicopter, one Beechcraft, three PT-6 aircraft or a K-8 aircraft and one Mi-17 helicopter. An Mi-24 helicopter was damaged in this attack, he said. This was in addition to the Bell 212 helicopter that crashed, he pointed out.
I constructed the sequence of events relating to the guerrilla attack on the SLAF airbase at Anuradhapura after talking to high-ranking sources at the Air Force Headquarters in Colombo. This is in addition to speaking to officers and men who were at the airbase in Anuradhapura at the time of the attack and thereafter. Apart from the details relating to the attack, I was able to determine that there were altogether 27 aircraft on the ground at the airbase at the time. These included some unserviceable aircraft too. Here is a breakdown:
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED INSIDE THE HANGAR AT THE SLAF BASE IN ANURADHAPURA:
1. Two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). These were brand new and were yet to be included in the Air Force inventory. They had been brought for acceptance trials "without obligation" by the Israeli supplier, Blue Horizon.
2. One Mi-17 troop transport helicopter. It is virtually reduced to ashes with only bigger parts remaining.
3. Four Chinese built PT-6 basic trainers.
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED NEAR THE RUNWAY (OUTSIDE THE HANGAR):
1. One US built Beechcraft 200. This was originally purchased in 1985 as a VIP transport aircraft. In 1995, it was modified into a surveillance aircraft with expensive equipment being installed. They included costly cameras and other sophisticated devices. Contrary to a foreign media outlet, which misquoted me, the loss of this aircraft does not hamper deep-sea naval operations. However, it very badly hampers aerial surveillance activity over deep seas. Inputs from such surveillance helped in naval operations in a very large measure.
2. One Chinese built K-8 intermediate jet trainer.
3. One Mil Mi-24 helicopter gun ship.
The above aircraft/helicopters which have been completely destroyed are a loss to the Air Force. There were also aircraft, both serviceable and unserviceable, that have been damaged. Highly placed Air Force sources I spoke to said only some of them could be reclaimed. Others will be a further loss. Thus, the exact number of aircraft/helicopters which the Air Force will not have will be known only when its Commander, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke, writes to the Ministry of Defence, asking permission to "write off" aircraft from his inventory. Here are the other details:
AIRCRAFT DAMAGED INSIDE THE HANGAR:
1. One Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) belonging to SLAF.
2. Three PT-6 basic trainer aircraft.
3. Five K-8 intermediate jet trainer aircraft. In some of these trainer aircraft the glass canopy has melted and the metal warped. In addition, some had the wing stripped off with only parts of the frame remaining.
4. Four unserviceable Italian built Siai Marchetti (Warrior) propeller driven bombers.
AIRCRAFT DAMAGED ALONGSIDE THE RUNWAY:
1. One Mil Mi-24 helicopter gunship
AIRCRAFT THAT WERE NOT AFFECTED AND COMPLETELY SAFE:
1. Three Mil Mi-17 troop transport helicopters. They were parked a distance away from the scene of fighting.
The cost of the losses at the airbase could be anything above an estimated US$ 30 million or over three billion rupees. That is based on prices paid years earlier. However, the replacement prices would be very much higher. This is not only because the prices have since gone up. In addition, the rupee equivalent to the dollar has also risen.
Two important facts relating to the guerrilla attack on the airbase are glaring. There is no doubt that the guerrillas have been receiving up-to-date intelligence on the lay- out and goings on at the airbase. There was inside information. It is this fact that helped them not only to plan the attack but also to repeatedly practise it in their hideouts in the Wanni using sand models. How the guerrillas received such intelligence becomes a critical question.
For several months now, some of the security measures at the airbase were hampered by work related to the extension of the runway. A private contractor had been given the task. A large fleet of lorries with construction materialhave been gaining access to the airbase every day.
Three different probes are now under way. The attack on the airbase is being probed by a Court of Inquiry chaired by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra. A second Court of Inquiry is probing the crash of the Bell 212 helicopter. The most important among the probe is the one being conducted by the CID. Only their findings will reveal the various lapses that led to the attack.
However, some of the fundamental aspects, like how the guerrillas gained entry to the airbase by cutting the chain link fence on the outer perimeter, to say the least is shameful. Here again, without meeting any resistance from sentries. No lessons are learnt from experience. That is how the guerrillas gained entry to attack the Air Force base at Katunayake on July 24, 2001. A suspected guerrilla cadre cut the chain-link perimeter fence covering the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation's (CPC) installations at Sapugaskande to gain entry a few months ago.
His body was found closer to the area from where he entered. The youth who was later confirmed to be on a reconnaissance mission had died after being stung by a snake. Police found documents in his possession. Some arrests were made and there was confirmation that the man was on the initial stages of a reconnaissance mission to plan an attack on the oil facility.
It is a strange co-incidence the Air Force also lost eight aircraft during the Tiger guerrilla attack at Katunayake. The types were, however, different. They were two Mil Mi-17 troop transport helicopters, three K-8 intermediate jet trainers, one MiG-27 and two Kfir jets. One A-340 and two A-330 airbuses of Sri Lankan Airlines were also destroyed during this attack.
Comparing the damage caused during the attack on the SLAF airbase in Katunayake (without losses to Sri Lankan Airlines) and the one at Anuradahapura, one fact becomes clear. The guerrillas caused more damage at Anuradhapura since the losses there are higher. It must also be remembered that during the attack at Katunayake, the guerrillas were unable to enter the "V" (or Vulnerable) area, which was the hangar. The damage they caused was by directing fire from the runway. However, at Anuradhapura the attackers entered the hangar to cause damage.
The attack on the airbase came just a week after the guerrillas attacked the Army detachment at Talgasmankada inside the Yala National Park (on October 15). The next day (October 16) an Army commando lost his leg and two Wild Life Range Officers were injured due to a pressure mine explosion near the detachment. Seven soldiers were killed and six were wounded in the attack. Special Forces, Commandos and infantry troops conducted a search operation in the Yala jungles. However, no arrests were made. Further checks are now under way by the newly raised 12th battalion of the Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment.
The two incidents come with only 30 days to go for LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran's "Maveerar ("Great Heroes") Day" address, one that is looked upon both by the Colombo based diplomatic community as well as local political leaders.
If Mr. Prabhakaran did not have anything to say in the form of "military achievements" outside the North and East before October 15 (the attack inside Yala), there are two incidents he could now boast of, one in the deep south and the other in a historic area under Government control. That is in his speech, which is viewed as a declaration of guerrilla policy for the coming year.
Thus, the task of preventing any more attacks that will give further leverage to the LTTE lay in the hands of the Security Forces and the Police. That is the challenge before them in the coming days and weeks.
Sweeping powers for new chief


Ma. Gen. Sanath Karunaratne
All military and police activity in the Anuradhapura district has been brought under Major General Sanath Karunaratne who was last week named Overall Operations Commander.
Defence Ministry sources said yesterday he has been given six specific tasks as his responsibility. They are:
• Exercise command over Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, Special Task Force (STF) and Civil Security Department personnel
tasked for operational duties within the Anuradhapura district.
• Prepare and implement operational plans within the district.
• Co-ordinate all deployment and operations within the district.
• Co-ordinate all intelligence agency activities.
• Co-ordinate matters pertaining to civil/commercial security and civil defence organisations.
• Prepare contingency plans, rehearse and implement them.
All security establishments, police stations civil/commercial security organisations within the Anuradhapura district will come under his command.
Meanwhile a new Directorate of Ground Operations has been created at the Air Force Headquarters. Earlier, functions relating to ground operations came under the purview of Director (Operations).

Terror in Anuradha pura Air Base

* LTTE launches ground and air attack on key SLAF base in A’pura
* Heavy casualties, several aircraft damaged in major battle

By Sunil Jayasiri

A question mark hung over the extent of the damage caused to the Air Force in the LTTE’s surprise pre-dawn ground and air assault on the heavily fortified Air Force base in Anuradhapura, damaging at least three aircraft including a sophisticated Mi-24 attack craft and a K-8 aircraft, the military said.

It said a Bell-212 helicopter was also destroyed when it crashed while pursuing the LTTE attackers.

Air Force spokesman Ajantha Silva said thirteen airmen, including four officers were killed and 22 injured.

“We found bodies of 20 LTTE cadres within the perimeter of the air force base,” he said.

Giving details of the pre dawn attack believed to be the first twin attack on a military base since the Tiger air attack on the Katunayake Air Force base, the spokesman said the attack was launched at about 3.20 am after some 20 cadres had infiltrated the key base. “While the air force and army personnel were engaging the Tiger fighters, two enemy light air craft dropped two bombs on the base,” the spokesman said.

He said a Bell 212 helicopter and a K-8 aircraft pursued the LTTE enemy air craft, when the Bell helicopter, which was airborne from Vavuniya, crashed at Doramadalawa in Mihintale due to a technical fault.

“Four personnel, including the two pilots were killed in the crash,” Group Captain Silva said.

The Daily Mirror however learned the helicopter crashed followed ‘friendly fire’ when ground troops fired at it suspecting it to be a rebel aircraft.Unconfirmed reports said more than three air craft including reconnaissance air craft; training craft and several buildings at the air force base, including the pilot training school were also damaged.

Virtually taking control of the base, the Tigers fired Rocket Propelled Grenades and automatic rifles.

However the Air Force spokesman said as the clearing operations were not complete, the exact figures of the damage to air craft could not be confirmed. A police curfew was also imposed in the Mihintale and Anuradhapura areas as the security forces launched a search operation for LTTE cadres. The curfew was later lifted around 4 pm yesterday.

Earlier, residents living in the vicinity of the air base were evacuated to safety.

The Tigers were believed to have entered the premises through the northern edge of the base dressed in Air Force combat uniforms using the cover provided by a nearby jungle patch near the Nuwara Wewa.

Initially the Tiger team had captured three guard points and one anti-aircraft gun located near the runway. The LTTE cadres had reportedly used the gun to attack the hangers, in which the air craft and training planes were parked.

The Tigers also reportedly destroyed an anti-aircraft gun position located near the air craft hangers. Sources claimed the Tigers damaged and intercepted some of the air craft parked in the hangers, to facilitate the get away of the two rebel air craft.

Hours after the LTTE attack on the Anuradhapura Air Force Base, Air Force fighter jets targeted LTTE locations in Iranamadu where the Tiger air planes were believed to have landed after carrying out attack.

A senior air force official said around 5 am yesterday, fighter jets bombed the suspected the hangars of the LTTE air wing close to the LTTE’s Iranamadu air strip. Details of LTTE casualties or damages were not immediately known.

Two teams conduct probe

Two special teams have been appointed by SLAF Commander Roshan Goonatillake to probe the LTTE attack on the Anuradhapura Base and the Bell-212 helicopter crash, spokesman Ajantha Silva said

Referring to claims and counter claims on damage to the Air Force aircraft in the pre-dawn attack, the spokesman said he would have to wait until the inquiries were over before making any definite statement and what has been made public was the immediate ground situation.