V. Suryanarayan
Was the LTTE supremo’s latest Heroes Day speech an illustration of characteristic defiance or an expression of a significantly weakened situation on the ground and increasing international isolation? Can there be a political way out of the vicious cycle?
Thousands of Tamil guerrillas were “standing ready to fight” and “we will overcome the hurdles before us” and “liberate our motherland,” thundered Velupillai Prabakaran, concluding his Heroes Day speech on November 27, 2007. A few minutes before the LTTE supremo began his speech, the Sri Lankan Air Force demolished the building that housed the Voice of the Tigers. Three weeks earlier, in a similar operation, Tamil Selvam, the leader of t he political wing of the Tigers, was killed. What is more, the rest of the world was tightening its screws on the terrorist organisation, with Washington in the lead, banning the activities of Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, one of the major fund-raisers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
Was Prabakaran’s speech an illustration of his characteristic defiance, intended to boost the sagging morale of the cadres and supporters? Was he hiding his despair and frustration behind the high-flowing rhetoric? Before dwelling on the text and the context, it is necessary to highlight certain important elements of his behavioural pattern over recent years.
The Heroes Day (Maveerar Nal) is celebrated with great pomp and show in the LTTE-controlled territory and also in countries where there is a substantial Sri Lankan Tamil presence. The lighting of the lamp by the supremo is to remember and commemorate the martyrs who have sacrificed their lives for the cause of Tamil Eelam. Sri Lanka watchers eagerly wait for this event, for the speech is an official prognosis of the immediate past and also contains indicators of future policy.
In his first Heroes Day speech (November 27 is also Prabakaran’s birthday) following the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), he made two important pronouncements: 1) Those who betray the cause of Tamil Eelam must be killed; and 2) if ever Prabakaran betrays the cause of Tamil Eelam, “you must kill him.”
For all his passionate commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam, he was influenced by Anton Balasingham, his comrade-in-arms for several years. On a number of occasions, the LTTE’s Political Advisor persuaded Prabakaran to make a tactical retreat from the goal in order to win international sympathy. Here are two notable instances:
When Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected President, she was very keen on bringing about “ethnic reconciliation” and expressed her readiness to initiate discussions without preconditions. In his book, Politics of Duplicity – Revisiting the Jaffna Talks, Balasingham recalled that Prabakaran was “sceptical” of Chandrika’s gestures and felt they were only a gimmick to win the support of Tamils as well as Sinhalese. It was Balasingham who advised his leader that it would be “politically prudent” to initiate a dialogue with Chandrika to find out how “genuine” she was in resolving the ethnic conflict.
Balasingham also played a key role in the conclusion of the ceasefire agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. Subsequent peace talks led to the Oslo Declaration, where the Tigers committed themselves to “explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka.” Professor G.L. Pieris, the leader of the Sri Lankan delegation, is on record that Balasingham was specifically asked whether agreeing to explore a federal solution meant the Tigers had renounced the military option. Balasingham replied “no,” because that was their “fallback position.” He added: “Why do you want to dwell on that because we have every hope and expectation that the journey that we have embarked upon will take us to the destination that we desire.” He continued: “Why is it necessary for you to look at the worst side of things and be pessimistic?”
I have focussed on the “moderating influence” of Balasingham on Prabakaran, because, for many years, the Political Advisor drafted the Heroes Day speeches. The present team of speechwriters clearly lacks Balasingham’s political savvy and finesse. Not surprisingly, the speech delivered on November 27, 2007 was a litany of accusations and complaints against the rest of the world; the only innocent person was Prabakaran; and the only just goal was the independence of Tamil Eelam, which can be attained only through violent struggle.
The major thrust of Prabakaran’s speech was the charge that the international community was collaborating with Colombo in marginalising the LTTE. The “partisan and unjust conduct of the international community” has undermined the confidence the Tamil community has reposed in it. The steady erosion of the parity between the Tigers and the government; the slow but steady construction of an ‘international safety net’ by the Sri Lankan government; the exclusion of the LTTE from major international conferences organised by donor countries; and what is more, despite occasional protests against human rights violations by the government, their readiness to strengthen the government’s military capabilities — all these were frustrating experiences for the Tigers.
Prabakaran has turned a Nelson’s eye to an equally important reality. The killing of political opponents, the attacks on the civilian population, the forcible recruitment of children into the guerrilla army — these inhuman acts have created a sense of revulsion against the Tigers in several parts of the world.
Mischievous and misleading
From an Indian perspective, the LTTE supremo’s reference to the international community “making the same mistake that India made many years ago,” the charge that Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was part of its “regional expansion,” and the assertion that the provisions of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987 did not even devolve powers as the “Banda-Chelva Pact” did are not just mischievous. They go against ground realities. There can be legitimate criticism of many aspects of India’s relations with Sri Lanka relating to the ethnic conflict. However, it must be acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was the first significant step towards devolution of powers to the provinces. It was an attempt to have a new constitutional arrangement for sharing power between the majority and minority communities. What led to its failure were the sharp divisions within the Sri Lankan government, the opposition of the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), and the intransigence of Prabakaran. Absence of a Sinhala consensus and given the violent opposition of the Tigers, the 1987 accord became a source of discord in Sri Lanka.
Equally relevant is Prabakaran’s unwillingness to understand and, where possible, exploit the contradictions within Sinhala society to the advantage of the Tamils. He has referred to the “implacability” of Sinhala chauvinism, adding that the Sinhala state was not interested in finding a peaceful solution; its objective, on the other hand, was to “occupy the Tamil homeland, destroy its resources and enslave the Tamil nation.” The revolt within the LTTE and the use of the rebel faction by the Sri Lankan armed forces, coupled with the ascent of Mahinda Rajapaksa to power with the support of the JVP and the Sinhala Urumaya, has put the clock back as far as peace prospects are concerned. The Supreme Court-ordered de-merger of the north and the east; the closure of the A9 highway; the downgrading of the proposals made by the Tissa Witarana Committee; and increasing emphasis on a political solution within a unitary state are clear indicators that the chasm dividing the Sinhalese and the Tamils has widened. Tamils living in Colombo and adjoining areas were subjected to untold humiliation when many of them were recently detained for interrogation. If the military pressure on the LTTE is not accompanied by political reforms, the reservoir from which the Tigers recruit their cadres might expand in a significant way.
In its recent report, the University Teachers of Human Rights (UTHR) has highlighted the irreconcilable positions of the two contending parties. The LTTE would continue to argue the futility of a political settlement with Sinhalese governments that were incapable of honouring commitments made earlier. On the other hand, those who advocate a military solution would point to the intransigence of Prabakaran and rationalise the loss of human lives as the inevitable consequences of a war imposed by a secessionist and terrorist organisation on the state.
In Sri Lanka today (as W.B. Yeats memorably said in The Second Coming), “the best lack all convictions, while the worst/are full of passionate intensity.” While the Tigers, maddened with arrogance, have set themselves on the path of destruction, the government seems determined to follow the military option, which, even if successful, can lead only to the peace of the graveyard. The question is whether anyone can display the courage, vision, and strategic and tactical skills to navigate a just and sustainable political way out of this vicious cycle.
(Dr. V. Suryanarayan is a leading scholar on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. He retired as Senior Professor and Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Madras.)
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